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I. INTRODUCTION: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY REASON GIVING 
The question of what factors an agency may rely upon to justify a 
particular implementation of a statutory mandate underpins much of 
administrative law.1  Whether reviewing the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s implementation of national primary ambient air quality 
standards under the Clean Air Act’s mandate to establish levels 
“requisite to protect the public health”2 or the Social Security 
Administration’s interpretation of disability under the Social Security 
Act,3 a court must engage the justifications an agency provided for its 
action.  In this way, agency reason giving facilitates judicial control of 
administration,4 and judicial assessment of an agency’s reasons 
necessarily entails assessment of the factors upon which an agency relied 
to reach any particular conclusion.5 
Administrative reason giving occurs within statutory and political 
contexts that determine the sufficiency of reasons an agency provided.  If 
the judicial review that administrative reason giving facilitates is to have 
                                                            
*Law clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.  Yale Law School, J.D. 2017.  I 
am grateful to Nicholas Parrillo for providing guidance on this project.  Thanks also to Nancy 
Musick and the editors of the Kansas Law Review for their careful and considered editing.  Any 
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  1.   See Richard J. Pierce Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision?, 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 68 (2009) [hereinafter Pierce, Factors an Agency Can Consider]; JERRY 
L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 214–15 (1990); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer: A Response to 
Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 204 (2007) [hereinafter Pierce, How Agencies Should 
Give Meaning].  Few scholars and even fewer courts have formulated the question so explicitly, 
despite the undeniable fact that an understanding of the permissible justifications for agency 
decisions under judicial review forms the foundation of any theory of administrative law.  
 2.   42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).  See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 
472 (2001). 
 3.   42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434 (2015). 
 4.   Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and 
the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 111 (2007) (noting that reason 
giving is a “protector of judicial review,” while simultaneously arguing reason giving is best 
understood as an individual right that renders those individuals upon which the law subjects rather 
than objects). 
 5.   Id. at 108. 
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any substantive component, courts must impose some limits upon the 
reasons sufficient to justify an administrative outcome.  In other words, 
substantive judicial review of administration requires more than “that 
agencies act based on reasons,” as some suggest is sufficient.6  The 
reasons an agency provides for an administrative outcome matter.  If the 
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division issued a new guideline 
revising the Division’s understanding of consumer welfare relying upon 
recent developments in the field of economics, those guidelines would be 
far more likely to survive judicial review than if those same revisions 
were justified as part of a politically-motivated attack by President 
Trump’s administration on Jeff Bezos—the Amazon CEO and owner of 
a newspaper Trump has attacked for its unfavorable coverage of his 
campaign.7  Because most statutes cannot and do not exhaustively list the 
reasons upon which an agency may rely in support of any given 
administrative outcome,8 the task of establishing the parameters of 
administrative reason giving has fallen to the judiciary. 
Unsurprisingly, then, the question of permissible considerations has 
been, if at times implicit, central to the contestation between technocracy 
and political accountability that has occupied most recent attempts to 
legitimate judicial review of the administrative state.9  Proponents of 
prioritizing democratic accountability as the foundational principle of 
judicial review of administrative action argue in favor of increased 
presidential involvement in administrative processes, generally claiming 
that courts should accept presidential direction of administrators as a 
permissible if not always decisive factor in agency decision-making.10  
Building upon then-Professor Kagan’s seminal article Presidential 
Administration,11 this argument contends that presidential involvement in 
                                                            
 6.   Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 
1406 (2016). 
 7.   See, e.g., Marc Fisher, Why Trump went after Bezos: Two Billionaires Across a Cultural 




 8.   MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 1, at 214. 
 9.   See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of 
Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE. J. ON REG. 549, 594 
(2018).   
 10.   That presidential rather than congressional control is the favored source of politically 
accountable administration was not always axiomatic; only when the Reagan administration sought 
to implement its broad, deregulatory agenda did presidential administration become the dominant 
explanation for politically accountable administration.  Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2247–48 (2001).   
 11.   Id. 
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and even control of administrative processes legitimates the “headless 
‘fourth branch’ of government”12 by rendering administrators 
accountable to the President, who is in turn accountable to the American 
people for those administrative determinations.13  Presidential 
involvement in both formal and informal rulemaking14 infuses 
administration with the political perspective necessary to dictate the 
value judgments for which agency expertise alone cannot account, 
thereby rendering administration more effective, and with a more direct 
link to the democratic process.  This valuation of judicial priorities in 
review of administration finds doctrinal expression in the Chevron 
doctrine,15 especially in the doctrine’s earliest iterations.16  Two 
arguments regarding judicial review of administration follow from this 
emphasis on political control.  First, that agencies should usually 
consider presidential direction as a decisive factor.  Second, that courts 
should grant deference to an agency’s derivation of the permissible 
factors for consideration, including political control, from the agency’s 
authorizing statute, to facilitate such political control of administration 
reviewing. 
On the other hand, proponents of technocracy or expertise-forcing17 
as the motive that should animate judicial review of administrative action 
                                                            
 12.   PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH SPECIAL STUDIES 29 
(1937) (citations omitted) (known as the BROWNLOW REPORT). 
 13.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2331–32. 
 14.   Almost all scholars would agree with Kagan’s declaration that “the analysis [in favor of 
presidential involvement in administration] with respect to adjudications, however, is fundamentally 
different . . . .”  Id.  Proponents of the unitary executive may constitute an exception; in its most 
reductive form, the argument for the unitary executive claims that the Constitution mandates 
presidential control over all executive actors.  See Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & 
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 
628–30 (2005).  In response, some commentators claim that presidential involvement in adjudication 
would violate the Administrative Procedure Act, the Constitution, or both. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, 
From a Unitary to a Unilateral President, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523, 549 (2008).  
 15.   Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).  See also 
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE 
L.J. 2, 38 (2009) [hereinafter Watts, Proposing a Place] (arguing that “Chevron underscored the 
relevance of political influences (and political accountability) to agencies’ interpretive processes” 
and thus “anchored the presidential control model.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  As we will 
see, however, this is not the only viable reading of Chevron.  See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The 
Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007).  
 16.   See Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, 
and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1814 n.9 (2012); Kagan, supra note 10, at 2372–73. 
 17.   I borrow this term from Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From 
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (2007).  Freeman and Vermeule define expertise 
forcing as “the attempt by courts to ensure that agencies exercise expert judgment free from outside 
political pressures, even or especially political pressures emanating from the White House or 
political appointees in the agencies.”  Id. 
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argue courts should discourage presidential involvement that all too often 
seeks to subjugate reasoned decision-making to the whims of presidential 
politics.  This argument contends that political interference degrades 
rather than enhances the legitimacy and efficacy of administration, 
meaning courts should require agencies evaluating potential courses of 
action pursuant to statutory authorizations to consider only those factors 
that Congress expressly authorized the agency to consider.18  Proponents 
of judicial review as a vehicle for expertise-forcing argue that political 
involvement will only impact administrative decision-making in those 
instances where the administrative outcome desired by the President 
diverges from the administrative outcome that would emerge from purely 
technocratic deliberation, and therefore rendering agency determinations 
more arbitrary.19  Accordingly, commentators concerned with agency 
expertise argue that Presidential involvement undermines both: (1) the 
efficacy of the administrative process by encouraging technically inferior 
outcomes that lack expert support, and (2) the democratic legitimacy of 
the administrative state by decoupling agency determinations from the 
permissible considerations contained in the relevant authorizing 
statutes.20  Expertise forcing and technocracy find doctrinal expression in 
cases such as Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency21 and 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Co.,22 which broadly hold that an agency must consider only those 
factors that Congress either expressly included in the authorizing 
                                                            
 18.   Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528, 532–33 (2007) (holding the EPA’s action was 
“arbitrary, capricious . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law” because the EPA’s justifications 
for claims that it would be unwise to regulate greenhouse gases “rests on reasoning divorced from 
the statutory text.”  (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).  
 19.   See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and Presidential Influence 
in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 698–99 (2014); Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
461 (2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountability]; Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 
88. 
 20.   See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 781 
(2007).  
 21.   Freeman and Vermeule compellingly argued that expertise-forcing animates the majority’s 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, where the majority held that the EPA “offered no reasoned 
explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change 
[and must therefore be regulated as pollutants under the Clean Air Act].”  Freeman & Vermeule, 
supra note 17, at 63–64 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534) (emphasis added).  
According to Freeman and Vermeule, pressure from President Bush prevented the EPA from making 
the determination with overwhelming support in the scientific record: that greenhouse gas emissions 
endanger public health or welfare.  Id. at 64.  See also Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: 
Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927 (2014) (summarizing the “Plan B Cases”). 
 22.   Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
2019 PARAMETERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REASON GIVING 579 
statute,23 or intended the agency to consider.24 
Most scholars have treated technocracy and political accountability 
as fundamentally incompatible even if mutually desirable.25  Courts have 
sought to maximize the expression of both expertise and accountability 
within whichever particular hierarchy of values a given court or 
commentator espouses.26  Accordingly, these two fundamental concerns 
provide metrics to evaluate the doctrines, both real and imagined, that 
seek to provide a framework for courts to address the following three 
questions concerning the factors an agency may consider when acting 
pursuant to a statutory delegation: (1) what factors may an agency 
consider when implementing its statutory authorization, (2) what factors 
may an agency decisively rely upon to justify any administrative action 
in the formal or informal record upon which judicial review rests, and (3) 
how should courts, in review of agency actions, evaluate an agency’s 
derivations of permissible and impermissible factors for consideration 
from the statute authorizing a particular administrative action.  The 
answers to these three questions could vary depending on the agency,27 
the statutory language in question,28 and type of extra-statutory factor the 
agency considered or argued dispositive,29 or the way in which the 
agency arrived at its conclusion.30  Nonetheless, a court’s prioritization 
                                                            
 23.   Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532–33.  Strangely, the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA 
declines to cite State Farm even once, perhaps due to the slight modification of arbitrary and 
capricious review employed in the former. 
 24.   State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.  (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious 
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider . . . .”).  
 25.   David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of 
Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2008). 
 26.   Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the 
Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2487 (2017).  
 27.   Whether, for example, the agency is an executive or independent agency.  See infra 
Section III.C.  
 28.   See, e.g., Luminant Generation Co. v. EPA, 675 F.3d 917, 926 (5th Cir. 2012) (“It is 
beyond cavil that the EPA may consider only the requirements of the CAA when reviewing SIP 
submissions.  The act provides that the EPA ‘shall approve [a SIP] submittal as a whole if it meets 
all of the applicable requirements of [the Act].’  This statutory imperative leaves the agency no 
discretion to do anything other than ensure that a state’s submission meets the CAA’s 
requirements. . . .” (citations omitted)).  See also Pierce, Factors an Agency Can Consider, supra 
note 1, at 82 (distinguishing between mandatory statutes requiring an agency take a particular action 
under certain circumstances, where existing doctrine discourages agency consideration of extra-
statutory political factors, and more permissive delegations of authority where the relevant statutes 
only specify that an agency “may” take the action at issue based on consideration of specified 
factors); Watts, Proposing a Place, supra note 14, at 46–47. 
 29.   See Watts, Proposing a Place, supra note 15 (encouraging judicial acceptance of express 
and transparent political involvement even as a decisive factor in an agency determination but 
discouraging the opposite). 
 30.   See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
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of either political accountability or technocracy and professional 
expertise dictate the doctrinal implications of any particular approach. 
Roughly, both scholarship and jurisprudence on the factors that an 
agency may consider when implementing a statutory authorization can 
be divided into the three following categories defined by each approach’s 
implications for judicial review: (1) highly deferential or even non-
review espoused by unitary executive theorists,31 (2) demanding review 
that views those considerations contained in any statute authorizing 
agency action as the exclusive grounds for any agency decision,32 and (3) 
varying review contingent upon different metrics of congressional intent, 
such as the relative independence of the agency receiving the authorizing 
delegation,33 or whether the agency implements in the appropriate 
manner its interpretation of the ambiguous factors Congress authorized 
that agency to consider.34  This Article will consider all three approaches, 
as all three find at least partial expression throughout administrative law.  
The contingent approaches prescribing varying levels of review warrant 
and receive the most attention both because the contingent approaches 
best encapsulate existing doctrine, and because they provide the best 
opportunity to accommodate both concerns for technocracy and political 
accountability. 
First, Section II.A will survey unitary executive theory, which 
largely favors a more deferential judicial review of administration.  The 
unitary executive argument holds that courts should permit an agency to 
consider any factors the executive directs that agency to consider in the 
implementation of its statutorily authorized delegation.35  Prudentially, 
unitary executive theorists argue that the president provides the most 
effective mechanism for politically accountable administration.36  While 
unitary executive theorists may maintain that presidential control 
enhances administrative expertise, perhaps with claims that Congress and 
line-item agencies are more susceptible to regulatory-capture than is the 
President as the only politician with a truly national constituency,37 
administrative expertise is undeniably of secondary import relative to the 
constitutional considerations that mandate presidential direction of 
administration, or so the unitary executive argument contends.  Section 
                                                            
 31.   See infra Section II.A. 
 32.   See infra Section II.B.  
 33.   See infra Section III.C. 
 34.   See infra Section III.B.  
 35.   See infra Section II.A. 
 36.   See infra Section II.A.  
 37.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2339. 
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II.A addresses this framework for judicial review in a limited manner 
because, regardless of the unitary executive theory’s interpretive power 
as a construction of the Constitution or normative power as a prescription 
for the ideal federal government, the theory remains disconnected and 
indeed incompatible with large swaths of existing administrative law.38 
Second, addressed in Section II.B, is an equally uncompromising 
position, albeit one that displaces presidential supremacy with 
congressional supremacy in advocating for a rigorous and searching 
judicial review of administration that would preclude an agency from 
considering any factors but those that Congress expressly authorized the 
agency to consider in the relevant delegating statute.39  Proponents of 
such an approach argue that agencies are at their most effective when 
unencumbered by political control, and able to pursue technocratic 
outcomes that best fulfill their statutory mandate.40  On the other hand, 
critics of such an approach argue it leads to regulatory ossification, 
which many commentators claim has reached unsustainable levels under 
State Farm review,41 an ostensibly more forgiving standard of review.42  
Indeed, as with the unitary executive approach, this irrebuttable 
                                                            
 38.   Part II addresses this in greater detail, but as an initial matter, it is extremely difficult to 
reconcile Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding constitutional 
independent agencies insulated from presidential control removal power) with the unitary executive 
theory.  Even more difficult for proponents of the unitary executive to accommodate in an account 
that seeks to describe existing doctrine is Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a special prosecutor, removable only for cause, tasked with investigating and 
prosecuting government officials for certain violations of federal law).  Further, given the nature of 
the unitary executive theorists’ claims—specifically, that their interpretation is constitutionally 
mandated— the approach’s merit seems far more likely to hinge upon broader questions of 
constitutional interpretation than on the theory’s ability to explain the far narrower domain of 
judicial review of administrative rulemaking. 
 39.   Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 
727, 740 (2009) [Beermann, The Turn Toward] (reading Massachusetts v. EPA to support “the more 
general principle that . . . when an agency decides whether to take even preliminary steps in the 
regulatory process that might lead to rulemaking, it must consider Congress’s factors rather than the 
agency’s or the administration’s preferred factors.”).  Beermann cites Deborah C. Fliegelman, 
Comment, The FDA and RU486: Are Politics Compatible with the FDA’s Mandate of Protecting 
Public Health and Safety?, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 143, 152 (1993).  See also Heinzerling, supra note 21, 
at 965–68 (noting the impermissibility of the FDA’s efforts to justify age restrictions on “Plan B” 
medication by reference to a risk the authorizing statute did not permit the FDA to consider, 
specifically tradeoffs between “Plan B” and other forms of contraception). 
 40.   See infra Part III. 
 41.   See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION (1993). 
 42.   State Farm provides a less rigorous review, requiring the reviewing court to invalidate 
only those agency actions premised upon factors that Congress did not intend the agency to consider. 
See infra Section III.A.  Nothing about the invocation of congressional intent necessarily limits 
agencies to those express factors contained in the statute.  See, e.g., MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 
1, at 214. 
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presumption that Congress intended an agency to consider only those 
factors expressly contained in the delegating statute appears incompatible 
with modern doctrines of judicial review.  In particular, this irrebuttable 
presumption cannot accommodate Chevron deference,43 which 
unquestionably applies to at least some instances in which agencies 
interpret their authorizing statutes to derive the factors that Congress 
intended that agency to consider in implementing that very statute.44 
Third, addressed in Section II.C, are the contingent approaches to 
judicial determinations of the factors that an agency may consider in 
making any particular determination, which evaluate congressional intent 
as dispositive in determining what factors an agency may or may not 
consider when exercising delegated authority.  While both unitary 
executive theorists and proponents of an irrebuttable and preclusive 
interpretive presumption require universal deference regimes—whether 
highly deferential or uncompromisingly scrutinizing—the contingent 
approaches advocate differential deference regimes.  Proponents of these 
contingent approaches, which include all members of the current 
Supreme Court45 with the possible exception of Justices Thomas46 and 
Gorsuch,47 argue that: (1) courts should not uphold agency 
determinations reached with or justified by considerations that Congress 
precluded the agency from considering, and (2) Congress did not intend 
an agency to neglect a relevant factor just because Congress did not 
expressly reference that relevant factor in the agency’s authorizing 
statute.48  Advocates of this contingent approach have pursued, with 
                                                            
 43.   See infra Section III.A. 
 44.   See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 200–01 (2017).   
 45.   Including Justice Kavanaugh.  See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 
Judging Statutes, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2152 (2016) (“Chevron makes a lot of sense in certain 
circumstances.  It affords agencies discretion over how to exercise authority delegated to them by 
Congress.  For example, Congress might assign an agency to issue rules to prevent companies from 
dumping ‘unreasonable’ levels of certain pollutants. In such a case, what rises to the level of 
‘unreasonable’ is a policy decision. So, courts should be leery of second-guessing that decision. The 
theory is that Congress delegates the decision to an executive branch agency that makes the policy 
decision, and that the courts should stay out of it for the most part. That all makes a great deal of 
sense and, in some ways, represents the proper conjunction of the Chevron and State Farm 
doctrines.”). 
 46.   See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (writing 
separately to “note that [the EPA’s] request for deference raises serious questions about the 
constitutionality of our broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes”). 
 47.   See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 48.   See, e.g., MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 1, at 215. (“This agency, any agency, should 
always read between the lines of its statute an implicit qualification of the form: ‘Don’t forget that 
this statute does not exhaust our vision of the good life or the good society.  Remember that we have 
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varying degrees of success, the establishment of different interpretive 
presumptions to approximate congressional intent regarding the 
allocation of interpretive authority between courts and agencies to derive 
extra-statutory reasons sufficient to support an administrative outcome.  
Disputes over the scope and precise formulation of these presumptions 
account for much of the doctrinal and academic disagreement in existing 
administrative law.  This Article centers upon two of these interpretive 
presumptions.49 
This Article argues that Chevron50 deference is best understood as 
one such contingent approach to the question of whether courts or 
agencies should derive the extra-statutory factors an agency may rely 
upon in support of any administrative outcome.  Because an agency 
necessarily construes a statute each time that agency determines the 
factors Congress authorized the agency to consider when arriving at an 
administrative outcome, courts must defer to that determination so long 
as the agency acts “with the force of the law”51 and the relevant statute is 
ambiguous.52  Chevron deference, then, seeks to create a presumption of 
judicial deference towards agency interpretations of the statutes 
specifying the factors that agency may consider contingent upon the type 
of action the agency employs to implement the relevant statutory 
construction.53  While such deference unquestionably applies to a wider 
range of agency legal determinations than the statutory construction 
required to derive the factors that an agency may or must consider before 
acting, all of an agency’s legal resolutions of ambiguous statutory 
mandates necessarily begin with a construction of the relevant statute to 
derive the factors that agency believes it is required or permitted to 
                                                            
other goals and other purposes that will sometimes conflict with the goals and purposes of this 
statute.  If we forgot to mention all those potential conflicting purposes in your instructions, take 
note of them anyway.  For heaven’s sake, be reasonable.’”); Watts, Proposing a Place, supra note 
15, at 52. 
 49.   See infra Part III.  While alternative presumptions exist, most are divorced from 
congressional intent and instead derive support from purely prudential considerations about the 
efficacy or accountability of administration.  See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With 
Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1589, 
1590 (2014) (arguing that the presence of “meaningful executive oversight, premised on a reasoned 
decision-making basis” in a particular administrative process should receive heightened judicial 
deference without deriving any support from claims about congressional intent). 
 50.   Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 51.   United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (granting Chevron deference only when 
agencies have exercised delegated power to act with the force of law).  Christensen v. Harris Cty., 
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000), excluded interpretive regulations from Chevron’s domain, requiring 
agencies issue legislative regulations to receive Chevron deference when promulgating regulations. 
 52.   Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 53.   Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1372.   
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consider. 
An alternative contingent approach argues for a presumption of 
judicial deference contingent upon the type of agency implementing the 
relevant statutory authorization.54  Justified by reference to degrees of 
presidential direction, this interpretive presumption distinguishes 
between statutory delegations to executive agencies as permitting that 
agency implementing the statute to consider or rely upon presidential 
direction, and statutory delegations to independent55 agencies as 
precluding that agency from considering presidential direction.56  
Reframed as a presumption about the types of agencies that should 
receive deference when interpreting statutes to derive the factors those 
agencies may consider when implementing their statutory mandate, this 
Article argues that courts should grant greater deference to executive 
agencies’ derivation of extra-statutory reasons for an administrative 
outcome, than to independent agencies’ derivation of extra-statutory 
reasons for an administrative outcome.  In doctrinal terms, this 
interpretive presumption implies that courts should grant Chevron 
deference to an executive agency’s statutory construction of the factors 
that agency may or must consider before acting, while granting Skidmore 
deference57 to an independent agency’s statutory construction of the 
factors that agency may or must consider before acting. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc.58 announced an even split on a closely-related question.59  In Fox, 
the Court reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard whether 
the Federal Communications Commission appropriately formulated a 
new policy on sanctionable60 language issued in an order that eliminated 
                                                            
 54.   First proposed by Kagan in Presidential Administration, supra note 10, but seemingly 
quickly abandoned.  See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 
SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2001) (arguing Chevron deference should apply only to those interpretations 
made by the individual to whom Congress delegated decision-making authority). 
 55.   See infra Section III.C.1 for a discussion of the definition of an independent agency in this 
context.  
 56.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2372.  
 57.   Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding an administrative agency’s 
interpretation warrants deference only insofar as courts find that agency’s interpretation persuasive). 
 58.   556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 59.   The relevant piece of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, arguing against heightened judicial 
review of independent agencies to ensure the apolitical nature of their determinations, commanded 
only three further votes.  Id. at 525.  Similarly, Justice Breyer’s dissent arguing for heightened 
judicial scrutiny of decisions made by independent agencies commanded only three additional votes.  
Justice Kennedy declined to address the question, concurring only with Justice Scalia’s result.  Id. at 
548 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 60.   Id. at 503 (“Actionably indecent”). 
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the FCC’s prior safe-harbor for non-repeating expletives.61  Justice 
Breyer, writing in a dissent joined by three other justices, formulated the 
question as whether the FCC’s “comparative freedom from ballot-box 
control [as an independent agency] makes it all the more important that 
courts review its decisionmaking to assure compliance with applicable 
provisions of the law . . . .” 62  The question presented in Fox did not 
require the Court to go so far as to reconsider the controlling doctrinal 
regime for evaluating an agency’s statutory construction of the factors it 
may and must consider when acting.63  This Article will nonetheless 
address the concerns for political accountability and technocracy 
animating the Fox decision to argue in favor of a new regime of judicial 
deference contingent upon the type of agency receiving the congressional 
delegation, rather than the type of action with which the agency 
implements its statutory interpretation. 
Part III will argue that, while the recipient agency’s independence is 
by no means a perfect mechanism for deriving congressional intent 
concerning the level of deference with which courts should evaluate that 
agency’s derivation of the factors that the delegating statute permits the 
recipient agency to consider,64 it is a comparatively superior indication of 
congressional intent that most effectively balances concerns for 
technocracy with concerns for political accountability.  First, while both 
courts and commentators recognize the fictitious nature of the notion of 
congressional intent upon which the Chevron presumption rests,65 
Congress actually considers the independence from presidential direction 
enjoyed by an agency receiving a particular delegation.66  The 
independence of the agency receiving the delegation, then, provides a 
stronger indication of congressional intent regarding that agency’s 
leeway to derive factors to consider from the relevant statute than the 
                                                            
 61.   Id. 
 62.   Id. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Justice Scalia, writing in a portion of 
the majority opinion also joined by only three other justices presented the question slightly 
differently: whether “the FCC’s status as an ‘independent’ agency sheltered from political oversight 
requires courts to be ‘all the more’ vigilant in ensuring ‘that major policy decisions be based upon 
articulable reasons.’”  Id. at 523 (majority opinion).  For Justice Scalia, this framing question is 
significant for the outcome, and may well be dispositive.  Id. (“Justice Breyer purports to ‘begin with 
applicable law,’ but in fact begins by stacking the deck.” (citation omitted)). 
 63.   Indeed, Chevron was not cited once in the opinions, as the FCC’s statutory interpretation 
was not challenged. 
 64.   See infra Section III.C.  
 65.   Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 192 (2006). 
 66.   See generally Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and 
Executive Agencies) 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: 
Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010). 
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mechanism by which an agency implements a particular statutory 
interpretation.67  Second, insofar as an agency’s independence presents a 
meaningful impediment to presidential control of administrative 
processes,68 concerns for political accountability should direct courts 
reviewing independent agency action to more closely ensure agency 
compliance with the only remaining source of political control: the 
authorizing statute.69  Third, concerns for administrative expertise also 
counsel in favor of heightened judicial review of an independent 
agency’s compliance with its statutory mandate to ensure the agency’s 
decision does not reduce the technocratic deliberation authorized by 
statute to an empty exercise in justifying politically-dictated outcomes.70  
Finally, deference contingent upon the type of agency receiving the 
congressional delegation rather than the type of action with which the 
agency implements its statutory interpretation creates a clearer bright-
line that resolves the intense ambiguity shrouding the distinction between 
agency actions with and without the force of law at the heart of 
contemporary disputes about Chevron’s domain.71 
That courts have applied Chevron deference to an agency’s statutory 
derivations of the permissible factors that any agency may consider when 
                                                            
 67.   See infra Section III.C. 
 68.   Id. 
 69.   FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 547 (2009) (Breyer, J. dissenting); 
Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 429 (2006) [hereinafter May, Defining Deference Down]; Randolph J. May, 
Defining Deference Down, Again: Independent Agencies, Chevron Deference, and Fox, 62 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 433 (2010) [hereinafter May, Defining Deference Down, Again].  However, some 
proponents of political involvement in the administrative process argue the benefits of presidential 
administration should subsume concerns for fidelity to congressional delegations.  Freeman & 
Vermeule, supra note 17, at 23.  Only if successful would presidential administration of the 
independent agencies implicate judicial review; accordingly, until the Executive has overcome 
agency independence in form or function, arguments for the presidential administration of 
independent agencies seek changes in presidential rather than judicial behavior.  While the President 
has enjoyed recent success in exerting some control over independent agencies through statutorily 
authorized channels of influence—predominantly, appointment power—entrenched conventions that 
insulate independent agencies from politics even absent formal barriers should prove insurmountable 
for proponents of presidential administration absent a significant turn towards the unitary executive 
model.  Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1213–
14 (2013).  
 70.   Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 78 (describing the court’s response to concerns of 
political involvement as “forc[ing] EPA to defend its second-order decision solely by reference to 
narrower technocratic factors.”); Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 19, at 789. 
 71.   Sunstein, supra note 65, at 221 (describing “a kind of Step Zero chaos”); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 
(2005) [hereinafter Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled] (arguing that “[y]ears have passed since 
Mead was decided, and we still lack a clear answer to the question when an agency is entitled to 
Chevron deference for procedures other than notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal 
adjudication”). 
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implementing the mandate or authorization,72 of course, does not make 
Chevron deference about statutory derivations of the permissible factors 
an agency may consider when acting.  Despite appearing in many forms, 
an agency’s statutory interpretations are, first and foremost, 
interpretations of the factors that Congress has authorized agencies to 
consider when implementing statutory authorizations or mandates.73  
Professor Pierce explains: 
There is only one link between [the] policymaking process and the 
process of statutory interpretation.  In the course of explaining why it 
made the decisions it made, the agency must refer to decisional factors 
that the underlying statute makes permissible.  For that purpose, the 
agency must engage in statutory interpretation to the extent necessary 
to explain why it believes that a decisional factor it applies is statutorily 
permissible.74 
In other words, the relevance of Chevron deference to agency 
interpretations of the statutorily permissible factors that an agency may 
consider when implementing its statutory mandate is the mechanism by 
which Chevron realizes its “imperialistic aspirations,”75 and implicates 
                                                            
 72.   Bluestone Energy Design, Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 74 F.3d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Because 
the Federal Power Act does not directly address the propriety of considering staff time and 
resources, we turn to the second step of Chevron, testing for reasonableness the Commission’s view 
that use of staff time and resources is relevant to the statutory factors.”); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 
v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647–52 (1990) (granting Chevron deference to the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation’s interpretation of an ERISA section to permit the PBGC to make a particular 
decision based upon a consideration not expressly referenced in the statute).  In LTV, the Court first 
held that the statute “does not evince a clear congressional intent to deprive the PBGC of the ability 
to base restoration decisions on the existence of follow-on plans” because a failure to consider 
follow-on plans “may tend to frustrate one of the objectives of ERISA that the PBGC is supposed to 
accomplish . . . .”  Id. at 648.  The Court permitted the agency to consider such factors, even though 
“[o]n their face . . . none of [the] statutorily identified purposes has anything to say about the precise 
question at issue—the use of follow-on plans as a basis for restoration decisions.”  Id. at 649.  
 73.   Part III provides a doctrinal summary of Chevron deference since its inception to 
demonstrate that Chevron deference is best understood as deference towards agencies’ statutory 
constructions of permissible factors for consideration. 
 74.   Pierce, How Agencies Should Give Meaning, supra note 1, at 204.  Professor Pierce may 
have overstated his point, however; in Chevron itself, for example, EPA’s statutory interpretation 
was the policymaking.  While agency policymaking no doubt requires the statutory derivation of 
permissible decisional factors, that interpretive process is not necessarily the only way in which 
agency policymaking intersects with statutory interpretation.  Nonetheless, Pierce’s claim retains its 
accuracy in practice so long as it is possible to reduce all of an agency’s interpretive processes to a 
derivation of statutorily permissible factors.  See infra Section III.A argues this is the case because 
Chevron Step Two, which assesses the reasonability of an agency’s interpretation, amounts to an 
assessment of the agency’s statutory derivation of the factors upon which it can rely in support of a 
particular administrative outcome.  In other words, judicial review of the reasonability of an 
agency’s interpretation is, at its core, judicial review of the reasonability of what the agency 
determines the aims of the statute or regulatory scheme to be.  
 75.   Sunstein, supra note 65, at 189.  
588 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
all judicial review of agency action. 
This Article concludes with an argument for a reformulated Chevron 
Step Zero, the force of which becomes apparent by reframing the 
doctrinal quarrel between proponents of technocracy and proponents of 
presidential administration as a dispute about the deference with which a 
court should review an agency’s statutory construction of the factors that 
Congress intended that agency to consider when acting to implement any 
given mandate.  While scholarship generally asks whether courts should 
permit agencies to provide political justifications for agency actions, the 
framing adopted in this Article more accurately depicts the context in 
which that question indirectly arises: review of an agency’s 
determinations of permissible factors for consideration.  This Article’s 
contributions are twofold.  First, this Article provides a more precise 
account of the existing regime of judicial review that explains and 
reconciles the two most prominent regimes of judicial review—State 
Farm and Chevron—without equating distinct standards of review.  
Second, this Article argues that the more precise account of existing 
doctrine offered within decisively undermines the strength of existing 
justifications for Chevron deference contingent upon the type of action 
with which an agency implements its statutory authorization, rather than 
the type of agency that receives a particular authorization, suggesting the 
desirability of a reformulated Chevron Step Zero that grants deference 
only to the relevant statutory interpretations of executive agencies.76 
II. CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE SUPREMACY: THEORETICAL 
JUSTIFICATIONS 
This Part surveys the theoretical justifications for and doctrinal 
implications of the unitary executive theory and a Congress-centric 
theory of administration.  While the former proscribes near-absolute 
judicial deference to an agency’s reliance upon extra-statutory 
considerations, the latter proscribes a scrutinizing judicial review of 
administrative actions to ensure agencies considered only those factors 
that the relevant authorizing statute expressly permitted the agency to 
consider.  Despite finding limited expression in a judiciary unwilling to 
                                                            
 76.   Numerous reformulations of Chevron Step Zero have been proposed, ranging from a 
“general presumption of authority in agencies to resolve ambiguity in the statutes they have been 
authorized to enforce”, United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting), to 
attempts “to distinguish among exercises of [] authority based on the identity of the final agency 
decision maker and then to reward, through more deferential judicial review, interpretations offered 
by more responsible officials.”  Barron & Kagan, supra note 54, at 202.  
2019 PARAMETERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REASON GIVING 589 
commit to either absolute, these two mostly-hypothetical regimes of 
judicial review remain the most influential schemes in competition with 
the contingent approaches that most closely track existing doctrine.77  
These two understandings of the role of judicial review in the 
administrative state diverge from contingent approaches addressed later 
in two fundamental ways: (1) both reject varying degrees of deference, 
preferring courts to adopt either highly deferential or carefully 
scrutinizing review of all agency actions; and (2) both reject 
determinations of implied congressional intent,78 focusing instead on 
either the express factors that the statute specifies an agency may 
consider when implementing the statute79 or the constitution’s exclusive 
grant of the take care power to the President.80  This unwillingness to 
accommodate considerations of congressional intent and disregard for 
the ascendant case-by-case deference regime81 provides one compelling 
                                                            
 77.   See infra Section III.A. 
 78.   While the statute’s text is no doubt central to determinations of congressional intent, to 
utilize text exclusively is in effect to deny intent’s relevance.  See John F. Manning, Textualism and 
Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional 
Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1461 (2003).  In this Article, 
textualism serves as an analogy, not a categorization of attempts to limit agency considerations to 
those factors expressly contained in the authorizing or delegating statute.  Indeed, the most 
prominent self-proclaimed textualist—Justice Scalia—explicitly dissented against such logic in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 552 (2007), writing: 
 Thus, the various “policy” rationales that the Court criticizes are not “divorced from the 
statutory text,” except in the sense that the statutory text is silent, as texts are often silent 
about permissible reasons for the exercise of agency discretion. The reasons EPA gave 
are surely considerations executive agencies regularly take into account (and ought to 
take into account) when deciding whether to consider entering a new field.  (citations 
omitted).  
How strict textualists who nonetheless favor expansive executive powers of interpretation, such as 
the late Justice Scalia, may reconcile their willingness to accept agency’s consideration of extra-
statutory factors with statutory textualism raises a number of interesting questions, here unanswered. 
 79.   Beermann, The Turn Toward, supra note 39, at 740–41.  Professor Beermann’s The Turn 
Toward Congress in Administrative Law ultimately defends a more moderate approach: 
The President’s policies should influence agencies both because the President is the 
constitutional locus of executive power and because of the democratic value of agency 
accountability through the President. The location of executive power in the President 
does not, however, tell us how much influence Congress should have over the execution 
of the law . . . . There is no sensible view of separation of powers that would favor 
impeding judicial review’s ability to aid Congress in keeping agencies in line with 
legislatively express priorities.  
Id. at 742–43. Beermann’s position is thus consistent with the reading of recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence infra Section III.A, albeit without articulating a presumption for the judicial review of 
the permissibility of agencies considering extra-statutory factors. 
 80.   Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 
104 YALE L.J. 541, 664 (1994) (“[T]he Constitution grants the President the authority to superintend 
the administration of federal law. There are no caveats. There are no exceptions.”). 
 81.   See infra Section III.B. 
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explanation for these approaches doctrinal obsolescence, as 
congressional intent has taken on increasing import to the Court’s 
justification for deference to administration.82 
The following subsections examine first the unitary executive model 
and its attendant regime of deferential judicial review of administration 
and, second, the statutory supremacy model and its attendant regime of 
“harder” look review.  Because each regime amounts to a totalizing 
embrace of either congressional or executive supremacy, the 
justifications presented by proponents of either regime provide a useful 
summary of the considerations for political accountability and 
technocracy, both of which the more accommodating regimes of judicial 
review will attempt to express.83  While the contingent approaches seek 
to balance a court’s evaluation of congressional intent with concerns for 
an agency’s political accountability and professional expertise, the 
unitary executive and statutory-supremacy models rely upon external 
considerations—most prominently, separation of power theories 
embedded in the constitution—to adopt totalizing modes of judicial 
review with little regard for prudential outcomes. 
A. Unitary Executive Theorists and Congressional Irrelevance 
Since at least the Reagan administration, concerns for 
administration’s lack of democratic accountability have justified 
enhanced presidential control of administration.84  In its earliest iteration, 
presidential administration adopted its most uncompromising form: the 
unitary executive strand of political administration.85  The unitary 
executive model claims that presidential control of administration is not 
only permissible, but constitutionally compelled.86  The “classic theory 
of the unitary executive” posits three powers relevant to administration 
as fundamental and exclusively committed to the executive by the 
constitution: “the president’s power of removal, the president’s power to 
direct subordinate executive officials, and the president’s power to 
                                                            
 82.   Id. 
 83.   Infra Part III. 
 84.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2277. 
 85.   Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 313, 315–18 (2010).  
 86.   Yoo, Calabresi & Colangelo, supra note 14 at 607; STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO 
BUSH 14–15 (2008); DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: 
POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1977, 24 
(2003). 
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nullify or veto subordinate executive officials’ exercise of discretionary 
executive power.”87 
In the context of judicial review of an agency’s justifications for 
selecting a particular course of action, all formulations of the unitary 
executive model of presidential administration88 argue that courts should 
not dictate those factors—whether political or otherwise—that an agency 
may consider or rely upon when implementing a statutory 
authorization.89  By positing agencies as agents of the executive meant to 
assist in the implementation of the law,90 the unitary executive model 
requires that the president possesses the unconstrained constitutional 
authority to control, even by removal, all executive officers.91 
Insofar as the unitary executive theory views the congressionally 
imposed restraints on the executive’s removal power upheld in 
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States92 as unconstitutional,93 the theory 
appears disconnected from the judicial review of administration in 
practice regardless of the theory’s force as a normative account of Article 
                                                            
 87.   CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 86, at 14. 
 88.   Tushnet, supra note 85, notes that there exist numerous manifestations of the unitary 
executive model, with ideological commitments varying in strength. Even under what Tushnet calls 
the “weak theory” of the unitary executive, however,  
the President has the power to provide policy direction to officers of the United States, to 
remove from their positions any such officers who refuse to comply with the President’s 
policy directions, and (perhaps) to implement presidentially determined policy directly by 
transmitting policy directives to employees who are obliged to carry them out or 
themselves face dismissal.   
Id. at 315.  Because the powers necessary for presidential administration—unconstrained removal 
power and presidential direction—reside even in the weakest formulation of the unitary executive 
theory, this Article need not address the theory’s stronger formulations in depth. 
 89.   This is not to say that statutory language is irrelevant to judicial review of administration 
under the unitary executive model; even courts subscribing to the unitary executive model would be 
unlikely to uphold an EPA emissions standard justified by reference to economic cost when the 
statute expressly precluded the agency from considering economic costs.  Rather, so long as the 
statute did not dictate a particular outcome, the President’s preferences could provide acceptable 
justifications for an administrative outcome even if that outcome were not supported by expert 
analysis.  Professor Edley usefully distinguishes between “politics-as-preference”, where courts 
recognize that “[t]he preferences of the decision maker cannot be eliminated from agency choices”, 
and the “politics-as-market” approach that grants dispositive status to political preferences even 
absent expert support.  CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 184 (1990).   
 90.   Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 80, at 597.  
 91.   CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 86, at 4. 
 92.   295 U.S. 602 (1935).  Even more difficult for proponents of the unitary executive to 
accommodate in an account that seeks to describe existing doctrine is Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of a special prosecutor, removable only for cause, tasked 
with investigating and prosecuting government officials for certain violations of federal law). 
 93.   CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 86, at 4. 
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II.94  Additionally, because any implications for judicial review of 
administration are of secondary importance to proponents of the unitary 
executive model, the model’s merit is unlikely to be resolved anywhere 
but the domain of constitutional interpretation upon which it relies. 
A more nuanced account of the unitary executive that seeks to 
accommodate the court’s holding in Humphrey’s Executor argues that 
even if the executive lacks the constitutional authority to remove all 
officers without cause, the executive “may withdraw his consent to the 
exercise of executive authority in particular instances” and thereby 
“totally retract a [noncompliant officer’s] executive power.”95  However, 
this understanding of removal power fails to provide an affirmative 
justification for the requirement that agencies consider extra-statutory 
factors, specifically presidential direction.  While the more forceful 
iterations of the unitary executive theory justify presidential 
administration as constitutionally mandated, this weaker formulation 
only presents presidential administration as constitutionally permissible, 
relying upon the prudential claims surveyed below to make the 
affirmative case for presidential control of administration. 
Accordingly, both unitary executive theorists and proponents of 
presidential administration argue that even if the constitution does not 
mandate presidential control, such control is both normatively desirable96 
and an accurate description of administrative decision-making since the 
Reagan administration.97  On the normative level, proponents of 
enhanced presidential involvement in administrative rulemaking argue 
that such control legitimates administration through the infusion of 
political accountability, provides regulatory impetus in an era 
characterized by ossification, and counters particularized interests that 
otherwise wield disproportionate influence.98 
                                                            
 94.   See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 10, at 2326 (arguing that “the cases sustaining restrictions on 
the President’s removal authority, whether or not justified, are almost certain to remain the law . . . 
as a result, any serious attempt to engage the actual practice of presidential-agency relations must 
incorporate these holdings and their broader implications as part of its framework”). 
 95.   Calabresi & Saikrishna, supra note 80, at 598–99. 
 96.   Kagan’s Presidential Administration, supra note 10, presents the most prominent 
formulation of this model of presidential administration.  
 97.   Then-Professor Barron’s recent history of presidential administration, supra note 25, at 
1097, provides compelling support for the descriptive components of Kagan’s claims.  But see 
Edward H. Stiglitz, Unitary Innovations and Political Accountability, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1133 
(2014). 
 98.   See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 10; Watts, Proposing a Place, supra note 15; Lawrence 
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994) 
(arguing strong presidential control of administration ensures political accountability the avoidance 
of factionalism); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 724–
26 (2016) [hereinafter Watts, Controlling Presidential Control]; EDLEY, supra note 89, at 184–99.  
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First, presidential direction legitimates the administrative state by 
introducing political accountability.99  As the only elected official with a 
national constituency,100 the president “establishes an electoral link 
between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing the latter’s 
responsiveness to the former.”101  Moreover, unlike other intrusions into 
administrative processes, presidential control creates a direct line of 
responsibility comprehensible to the public, thereby increasing that 
“fundamental precondition of accountability in administration”: 
bureaucratic transparency.102  Even if presidential involvement 
imperfectly enhances the accountability of administration,103 the claim 
that presidential involvement is a comparatively more effective 
instrument of accountability cannot be easily refuted.104 
Second, proponents of political control argue that courts’ acceptance 
of presidential involvement in administration reduces regulatory 
ossification, a claim advanced in two forms.  The weaker formulation 
argues that judicial acceptance of political justifications as sufficient or 
even supporting bases for agency action provides another mechanism for 
upholding agency determinations subject to hard look review because an 
increase in the availability of justifications available for a particular 
agency action will decrease the likelihood that agencies decline to act out 
of fear of judicial review.105  The stronger formulation contends 
presidential direction and control imputes “energy” into administration, 
defined by Kagan as “the imposition of a coherent regulatory philosophy 
across a range of fields to produce novel regulatory (or for that matter, 
                                                            
 99.   Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, supra note 98, at 724–25; Mark Seidenfeld, The 
Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 
1457 (2013) (arguing that “for rulemaking in which the President personally dictates his preference 
for an outcome at the end of the deliberative process, presidential preference has greater legitimacy 
than the independent choice of the agency.”).  But see Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, 
Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852 (2012). 
 100.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2336.  
 101.   Id. at 2332.  
 102.   Id. Kagan does acknowledge, however, that the strength of these claims varies greatly 
depending upon the President’s willingness to take responsibility, and thus blame or credit, for 
administrative actions.  Kagan notes that Reagan “usually tried . . . to veil his and his staff’s 
influence over administration”, while Clinton claimed “authority to make discretionary decisions 
delegated to the agencies,” exercised “that authority in public directives,” and spoke of “agency 
actions as his own.”  Id. at 2333. 
 103.   It is a dubious proposition that a president’s electoral success hinges upon any particular 
administrative decision in which he may involve himself, for example.  
 104.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2334. 
 105.   Watts, Proposing a Place, supra note 15, at 41–42 (“If agencies were allowed to justify 
their decisions in both technocratic and political terms, then these sorts of ‘ossification’ charges 
likely would be softened because courts would have yet another reason to uphold agency 
decisions.”). 
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deregulatory) policies.”106  According to Kagan, executive “energy” 
alleviated regulatory ossification in both the Clinton and Reagan 
administrations.107  Executive directives and the refashioning of 
administrative priorities that occurs with changes in administration thus 
create the impetus for regulatory development.108 
Third, proponents of presidential administration argue political 
control enhances rather than undermines bureaucratic expertise.  
Building upon the aforementioned “energy” claims, proponents argue 
that presidential control coheres administration across regulatory 
schemes in agency rulemaking.109  Where rulemaking conducted by 
agencies unaccountable to the president may instead prioritize the narrow 
interests reflected in their constituencies,110 presidential involvement 
ensures that agencies consider the broader context in which regulation 
(or deregulation) occurs.  Rather than heighten technocratic expertise, 
narrow mandates and narrower sets of considerations blind agencies to 
the bigger picture necessary for efficacious regulation, or so the 
presidentialists claim.111 
Crucial to all three of these claims is the notion that no administrator 
can avoid political involvement in bureaucracy.112  Insofar as politics, 
defined by the prioritizing of particular values, is a necessary component 
of the rulemaking process, proponents of presidential administration 
argue that agencies will distort facts and science to align with embedded 
political goals even absent explicit presidential control.113  The removal 
of presidential control that reflects democratic input from the 
administrative rulemaking process will not render agency decisions less 
political, but rather force the political valuations underground.114  In this 
                                                            
 106.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2341, argues that this is particularly true when administrative 
ossification reflects congressional partisan gridlock. 
 107.   Id. at 2345. 
 108.   Id. at 2341. 
 109.   Id. at 2340.  
 110.   Whether special corporate or special “public” interests, the groups with the incentives to 
engage the regulatory process seldom reflect the national polity as a whole. 
 111.   Vermeule, supra note 26, at 2480.  
 112.   Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, supra note 98, at 724 (concluding that “it is futile 
to try to sanitize agency rulemaking of political influences” because, “[w]hen science and expertise 
alone cannot answer questions concerning how or when best to regulate, competing value-laden 
policy preferences necessarily and inevitably will come into play.”); Mark Seidenfeld, The 
Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 197 (2012). 
 113.   Watts, Proposing a Place, supra note 15, at 40.  
 114.   EDLEY, supra note 89, at 188 (“In these circumstances, the remand justified through a 
scientific lens merely invites a subterfuge in the parading of expertise.”); Watts, Proposing a Place, 
supra note 15.  
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sense, technocracy and presidential administration remain compatible.  
Because rulemaking, and indeed almost all administrative processes, 
involve both factual and value judgments, technical expertise and politics 
necessarily coexist.  To the extent that presidential control provides an 
express set of value priorities to structure the technical evaluations 
below, as proponents of presidential administration argue occurs, the two 
priorities may take on mutually reinforcing forms. 
That each of these arguments for presidential direction of 
administration finds significant empirical and theoretical support, 
however, does not, in and of itself, provide sufficient justification to 
adopt even the weaker unitary executive model as a framework for the 
judicial (non)review of administration.  As Part III demonstrates, various 
interpretive presumptions exist that, while owing significant ideological 
debt to the unitary executive theorists,115 need not embrace the theory in 
its entirety to promote presidential involvement in administration.  Even 
the weaker formulation of the unitary executive theory’s persuasiveness 
rests on other grounds,116 and the administrative implications remain 
secondary and disconnected from the existing state of the law.  Indeed, 
while perhaps able to accommodate the court’s decision in Humphrey’s 
Executor that constitutionally validated the for cause removal 
requirements with which Congress insulates independent agencies, 
Morrison v. Olson’s function usurpation test117 remains incompatible 
with even the weakest formulation of the unitary executive theory.118 
B. Statutory Supremacy and Presidential Irrelevance 
The statutory supremacy model dictates a model of judicial review of 
administration opposite to that dictated by the unitary executive model.119  
                                                            
 115.   It is for this reason that this Section surveys the normative arguments for presidential 
administration in such depth.  Even if they prove insufficient to support the weight of the unitary 
executive theory in its entirety, these claims provide influential metrics for assessing the values 
promoted by judicial review of administration in its less absolute forms.  
 116.   Originalist readings of the constitution, predominately.  
 117.   Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (“There is no real dispute that the functions 
 performed by the independent counsel are ‘executive’ . . . .”).  
 118.   Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC 103, 119 (2009). 
 119.   The phrase statutory supremacy intends to evoke—without incorporating—the concept of 
legislative supremacy in statutory interpretation, which places courts in a subordinate role to 
Congress in the interpretation of statutes so as to implement a particular notion of public policy.  
Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989).  
Here, statutory supremacy subjugates both agencies and courts to Congress in the implementation of 
a particular notion of public policy. 
596 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
The statutory supremacy approach counsels courts to review 
administration to restrict the factors agencies consider when 
implementing a statutory mandate or authorization to only those factors 
referenced in the relevant statute.  This regime of judicial review 
premised upon statutory supremacy derives theoretical backing from two 
distinct, and perhaps contradictory, sources: technocracy and 
congressional control of administration.  Both justifications, however, 
rest upon the assumption that agencies are more likely to consider either 
expertise-impeding or political extra-statutory factors than expertise-
enhancing logically relevant extra-statutory factors that Congress failed 
to expressly include but which are consistent with congressional intent.120 
First is a belief in technocracy; agencies permitted to consider or rely 
upon extra-statutory factors when implementing a statutory mandate will 
become too easily swayed from technically sound outcomes by the 
President’s political priorities.121  Even if political priorities in 
administration are inevitable, expertise-forcing may effectively suppress 
agency reliance upon political pressure in the following ways: (1) if 
forced to justify decisions only with reference to expertise-related 
factors, agency officials “sufficiently concerned for the agency’s 
reputation as an expert” might refrain from distorting technocratic 
decisions for fear of “incurring mockery and outrage from scientific and 
technocratic experts”;122 (2) “if the agency realizes that any first-order 
judgment it makes will alienate some constituency or other . . . then it 
may decide to let the scientific chips fall where they may, on the 
principle that one might as well be honest if dishonesty will not pay”;123 
and (3) the threat of judicial review, even if not always effective at 
identifying dispositive political factors an agency considered, may at 
least deter agencies from trying in those instances where the science is 
clear.124 
Concerns for technocracy, however, need not lead to blanket 
prohibitions of agency reliance upon extra-statutory considerations of the 
kind contemplated by certain readings of the majority in Massachusetts 
                                                            
 120.   Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 88–89.  
 121.   This logic underpins the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. See generally 
Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 83. 
 122.   Id. at 98 (“A person who is willing to refrain from pointing out that the emperor is wearing 
no clothes may balk at saying out loud that the clothes exist.”). 
 123.   Id. at 98.  
 124.   Id.  See also Heinzerling, supra note 21, at 971 (explaining the blatant scientific 
inaccuracies underpinning the FDA’s justifications for age limits on access to “Plan B” undermined 
the FDA’s ability to defend the administrative outcome it sought in court).  
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v. EPA.125  Even if one accepts that agency consideration of extra-
statutory factors more often reflects political control than agency 
expertise, one need not accept that a prohibition on agency consideration 
of extra-statutory factors is superior to a prohibition on agency 
consideration of political pressure.126  In this way, then, the fate of the 
prudential justifications for statutory supremacy mirror the fate of 
prudential justifications for the unitary executive model: even if 
compelling, the justifications prove ill-fitting for the approach on behalf 
of which they are marshalled.  Accordingly, statutory-supremacists must 
justify their desired regime of judicial review without exclusively 
resorting to criticisms of political involvement in administration. 
The second pillar upon which statutory supremacy rests its case is 
similarly uncompelling: the belief that agencies are best understood as 
agents of Congress, and agencies’ consideration of extra-statutory factors 
serves to weaken Congress’s control of administration and enhance the 
President’s.  Statutes serve as the most fundamental method of 
congressional control of administration,127 and in this sense, any agency 
                                                            
 125.   Pierce, Factors an Agency Can Consider, supra note 1, at 80. 
 126.   In defense of the over-inclusive prohibition on extra-statutory considerations, one might 
argue that both implementing agencies and reviewing courts have great difficulty distinguishing 
between expertise-enhancing and expertise-impeding extra-statutory factors, and that the corrosive 
threat of expertise-impeding factors such as political pressure justifies the absolute prohibition on 
extra-statutory considerations.  That courts would be unable to distinguish between logically relevant 
factors that Congress neglected to include in the list of statutorily authorized considerations and 
politically-motivated pressure from the President is not inconceivable, but unlikely for two reasons.  
First, the politically-motivated considerations are more likely to be removed from the broader 
statutory scheme in which the agency acts, meaning the reviewing court should be able to distinguish 
political considerations from those considerations embedded within the purpose if not the text of the 
statute.  The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, was able to reject as politically-motivated 
EPA’s concerns about the foreign policy implications for deciding to categorize greenhouse gas 
emissions as pollutants because the Clean Air Act does not authorize EPA to justify decisions with 
reference to foreign affairs.  549 U.S. 497, 534 (“Congress authorized the State Department—not 
EPA—to formulate United States foreign policy with reference to environmental matters relating to 
climate.”).  Second, and to the extent that political pressure may align itself with statutorily 
authorized considerations, that pressure will be unlikely to find the same scientific or technical 
support in the record, rendering political pressure susceptible to discovery under substantive review.  
Professor Heinzerling, supra note 21, at 928, demonstrates that consequences for an agency found to 
be acting in bad faith may be particularly severe: “when an agency breaks all of these rules at 
once . . . it can expect not only an icy judicial reaction, but also, if the issue is important enough, an 
existential crisis within the ranks of the agency itself.”  Thus, even the possibility of a court 
recognizing an agency’s masked political considerations may be sufficient to deter such behavior. 
 127.   Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 73 (2006) 
[hereinafter Beermann, Congressional Administration].  The creation of a particular agency 
insulated from presidential control, or the delegation of regulatory authority to an agency already 
insulated from presidential control illustrates the broad ways in which Congress utilizes legislation 
to control administration.  Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The 
Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671 (1992) (distinguishing between ex ante 
and ex poste congressional controls of administration). 
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divergence from the text of the statute marks a divergence from 
congressional control of administration.  This divergence is especially 
troubling when Congress delegates authority with precise instruction for 
implementation.128  As with the unitary executive model, proponents of 
congressional control of agencies may argue that the view of agencies as 
agents of Congress is constitutionally mandated.129  The claim that 
consideration of extra-statutory factors enhances presidential control of 
administration relative to congressional control rests upon an intuitive 
assumption: because of various institutional structures such as the Office 
of Budget and Management that place agencies under the immediate 
control of the White House, the White House is more likely to be able to 
coerce agencies into considering presidential priorities than is 
Congress.130  Judicial review, congressionally authorized and structured 
by the APA, thus serves as the mechanism by which Congress counters 
enhanced presidential control of administration. 
For this reason, statutory supremacists doctrinally advocate for 
courts to use the first of State Farm’s instances of arbitrary and 
capricious decision-making—“if the agency has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider”131—to invalidate agency action 
that relies upon any factor other than those specified by Congress in the 
agency’s authorization or mandate.  Much to the frustration of statutory-
supremacists, however, courts have relied upon the dual ambiguities 
inherent in State Farm’s exhortation that agencies not (a) rely upon 
factors which Congress did not (b) intend it to consider.  First, in 
administrative processes, “relied” creates significant ambiguity: did the 
Supreme Court in State Farm preclude agencies from considering those 
factors Congress has not intended it to consider, or did the Supreme 
Court only require agencies to justify administrative outcomes by 
                                                            
 128.   See, e.g., Biodiversity Assocs. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that 
“the executive role of ‘taking Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ is entirely derivative of the 
laws passed by Congress” so long as “Congress is exercising its own powers with respect to matters 
of public right”). 
 129.   William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the 
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 
40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 118 (1976).  Also like with the unitary executive theorists, the 
ultimate merits of this constitutional interpretation reside beyond the scope of this Article because 
the question addressed here of the factors upon which an agency may base its decision is unlikely to 
be dispositive. 
 130.   Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a 
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1986); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of 
Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 443, 446–47 (1987).  But see Beermann, 
Congressional Administration, supra note 127.  
 131.   Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43.  
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reference to statutorily permissible factors and thereby permit agencies to 
consider but not rely upon extra-statutory factors?  As a practical matter, 
it would seem exceedingly difficult for reviewing courts to prohibit 
agencies from even considering political factors, especially if such 
considerations occurred outside the record or under the guise of scientific 
or technical disputes.132  Indeed, courts have accepted agencies 
considering political factors to decide on a course of action so long as the 
agency could justify all of the potential outcomes by reference to 
statutorily-authorized considerations.133 
More commonly, however, courts have relied upon the ambiguous 
notion of congressional intent to avoid limiting agency justifications for 
an administrative outcome to those considerations expressly contained in 
the agency’s authorizing statute.  This possibility emerged out of the 
Chevron decision only a year after State Farm, suggesting courts 
recognize that the agency is best situated to derive the statutorily 
permissible factors upon which it may implement its statutory 
authorization, and defer to the agency’s statutory construction of 
ambiguous statutes.134  The statutory text, of course, provides only one 
indication of congressional intent, and not necessarily a dispositive one 
with regard to the factors upon which an agency may make a decision.135  
The following Part summarizes the ways in which courts have attempted 
to approximate congressional intent regarding the factors an agency may 
consider since Chevron and State Farm were decided over three decades 
ago.  The answers, by and large, have frustrated proponents of statutory 
supremacy. 
III. DOCTRINES OF DIFFERENTIAL DEFERENCE: THE CONTINGENT 
APPROACHES 
As a preliminary matter, Section III.A will explain both the centrality 
of Chevron deference to agency determinations of permissible factors for 
consideration, and the ways in which these determinations suggest 
reformulating the domain136 of Chevron deference.  Before evaluating the 
                                                            
 132.   Watts, Proposing a Place, supra note 15, at 13.  
 133.   EDLEY, supra note 89, at 193; Pierce, Factors an Agency Can Consider, supra note 1 
(arguing that only in instances where the statute mandates action contingent upon particular 
considerations is the agency unable to resort to other factors as a justification for an administrative 
outcome). 
 134.   Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 135.   See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005). 
 136.   This Article distinguishes between the “content” and “domain” of Chevron deference. 
Content refers to the level of review applied, while the domain refers to the conditions under which 
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doctrines governing the conditions under which courts grant Chevron 
deference,137 it is necessary to understand what is at stake: the degree of 
deference sought.  Accordingly, Section III.A will attempt to 
demonstrate the two assumptions upon which the rest of the Article 
proceeds: (1) Chevron continues to amount to the primary doctrinal 
framework governing agency’s derivations of permissible factors for 
consideration and (2) those derivations of permissible factors for 
consideration continue to structure Chevron’s Step Two reasonableness 
test. 
The remaining two Sections examine two sets of conditions under 
which courts grant administrative agencies deference in their statutory 
constructions of the factors that Congress intended the agencies to 
consider when implementing a particular delegation.  The first approach 
is the one that courts have adopted, whether willingly or by 
circumstance, over the past three decades: Chevron Step Zero.138 
Chevron Step Zero encompasses the evolving set of conditions under 
which courts grant deference to agency interpretations of law.  When 
first articulated in 1984, the only necessary condition for an agency to 
receive deference seemed to be that the relevant language in the relevant 
statute be ambiguous.139  Over time, courts narrowed the domain of 
Chevron, arriving at a set of conditions necessary for an agency’s 
interpretation to receive deference.  Those conditions require not only 
that the relevant statutory language be sufficiently ambiguous, but also 
that the agency implement its interpretation with “the force of law,”140 
that the agency be the primary agency tasked with the implementation of 
the regulatory regime of which the ambiguous statute is part,141 and that 
the ambiguity not concern a question of major economic or political 
significance.142  Taken cumulatively, these cases narrowing the number 
                                                            
that deference is granted.  
 137.   Infra Section III.B.  
 138.   Sunstein, supra note 65. 
 139.   Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
 140.   United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (establishing most explicitly the so-
called “Chevron Step Zero” doctrine, which grants Chevron deference only when agencies have 
exercised delegated power to act with the force of law).  Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 
(2000), excluded interpretive regulations from Chevron’s domain, requiring agencies issue 
legislative regulations to receive Chevron deference when promulgating regulations.  
 141.   See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152–53 
(1991) (granting greater deference to the Secretary of Labor’s construction of a statute than that of 
the OSHRC). 
 142.   See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015). 
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and type of agency actions entitled to Chevron deference demonstrate 
that “the deference rule has become disconnected from [the] 
considerations relating to presidential involvement”143 that both 
commentators and members of the court initially considered 
fundamental. 
Simultaneously, and the likely cause of the narrowing of Chevron’s 
domain, doctrine has crystallized around the likely fictitious notion of 
congressional intent as the foundational justification for the Chevron 
doctrine.144  Following the doctrinal summary that illustrates this 
evolution in justification, then, this Part argues that the necessary 
conditions for the application of Chevron deference are ill-suited for the 
realization of both the original and reformulated aims animating the 
Chevron doctrine.  The Supreme Court’s attempt to weld a Chevron 
doctrine initially concerned with promoting administrative accountability 
through presidential control and facilitating agency employment of 
technical expertise onto a legal fiction of legislative intent has 
undermined administrative accountability, technocracy, and indeed, 
Congress’s intent.  Section III.C thus argues for a streamlined alternative: 
courts should grant greater deference to executive agency’s 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes than to those of independent 
agencies. 
                                                            
 143.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2373.  See also Sunstein, supra note 65, at 191 (arguing the 
application of Chevron deference has become far too limited under Step Zero). 
 144.   See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“A premise of 
Chevron is that when Congress grants an agency the authority to administer a statute by issuing 
regulations with the force of law, it presumes the agency will use that authority to resolve 
ambiguities in the statutory scheme.”); Sunstein, supra note 65, at 192 (noting that both views of 
Chevron holding sway over the Supreme Court “converged . . . on a distinctive understanding of 
Chevron, one that roots the decision in a theory of implicit congressional delegation of law-
interpreting power to administrative agencies.  Both [views] explicitly recognized that any 
understanding of legislative instructions is a ‘legal fiction’ . . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. 
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (“The Supreme Court in recent years 
has endorsed the notion that Chevron rests on implied congressional intent.”).  How this notion of 
Chevron as a presumption of legislative intent squares with even more recent developments like the 
“major question” doctrine, see, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89, remains unclear.  Worth 
noting, however, is the even greater inability of the “political accountability” understanding of 
Chevron to account for the “major questions” doctrine.  Indeed, if Chevron deference were primarily 
motivated by concerns for democratic accountability, it would make little sense for courts to defer to 
agencies’ interpretations on only those statutory constructions of relative insignificance while 
retaining more searching review for the questions of major economic and political importance 
where, presumably, democratic accountability should be of even greater relevance.  This is not to 
argue against the “major questions” doctrine, but only to note (1) that the doctrine cannot decisively 
resolve disputes about the justifications supporting Chevron deference as (2) the doctrine appears 
incompatible with most of the concerns animating Chevron deference. 
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A. Chevron Deference: Relevance and Stakes 
Chevron deference is best understood as a development in the 
standard by which courts consider one particular subset of agency 
decisions subject to arbitrary and capricious review as articulated in State 
Farm.145  State Farm, which remains the seminal expression of the 
arbitrary and capricious review standard, provided four circumstances in 
which “normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious”, 
including “if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not 
intended it to consider.”146  Accordingly, any judicial application of 
substantive147 arbitrary and capricious review requires judicial 
determinations of congressional intent concerning the factors upon which 
an agency may rely.148  Chevron provides the specific test with which 
courts review agency interpretations of statutes to derive permissible 
factors for consideration: (1) “whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue”, and (2) if the statute is ambiguous 
indicating Congress has not directly addressed the question, “the 
                                                            
 145.   Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  See 
also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 621–22 
(2009) (“Courts and commentators have converged on an emerging consensus that the ‘arbitrary, 
capricious, and abuse of discretion’ standard set forth in Section 706(2)(A) supplies the metric for 
judicial oversight at Chevron’s second step.”). 
 146.   State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.  The other three instances of arbitrary and capricious action 
are: “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”  Id.  
 147.   Arbitrary and capricious review, including as employed by the Court in State Farm, has 
traditionally been understood as more procedural than substantive.  See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, 
LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (implying a distinction between State Farm review of 
procedural defects in the administrative process, where “[o]ne of the  basic procedural requirements 
of administrative rulemaking is that an agency must give adequate reasons for its decisions”, and 
Chevron deference towards agency constructions of law).  As in other areas of law where the 
procedure-substance binary blurs under close inspection, judicial determinations of what amount to 
“adequate reasons for its decisions” appear more substantive than procedural, especially where those 
determinations require constructions of statutes to derive the reasons for agency action the relevant 
statute authorizes or even mandates.  Accordingly, this Article refers to the first State Farm 
condition of “arbitrary and capricious agency action” as substantive arbitrary and capricious review.  
At risk of unnecessarily complicating matters, it is also worth noting that judicial invalidation of 
agency action for justifying an administrative outcome with reference to a statutorily impermissible 
consideration may not strictly fall under “arbitrary and capricious” action, but instead “otherwise not 
in accordance with law”, the less frequently referenced third justification for holding agency action 
unlawful under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  State Farm’s characterization of agencies relying upon 
considerations Congress did not intend that agency to consider firmly placed such analysis under the 
“arbitrary and capricious” prong for invalidating agency action, however.  
 148.   See Gersen & Vermuele, supra note 6, at 1371.  State Farm’s relevant factor test exists 
“simply to ensure that the agency has given due consideration to any factors made relevant by the 
authorizing statute itself, and to ensure that the agency has not considered any factors that the statute 
rules off-limits.”  Id. 
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question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”149 
While the Chevron doctrine’s relevance to substantive arbitrary and 
capricious review is undeniable, it is not immediately apparent that the 
doctrine is best understood as refining the standard with which courts 
review an agency’s interpretation of a statute to derive the factors that an 
agency may consider when implementing that statute.150  Indeed, 
Chevron extends to other legal determinations an agency may 
promulgate, well beyond derivations of statutorily permissible decisional 
factors.151  Nonetheless, agencies’ derivations of the permissible factors 
for consideration are a precondition to any other form of statutory 
construction that follows.152  Even in Chevron, the court could only 
review the EPA’s definition of the term “source” within the context of 
the relevant statutory framework’s aims—“accommodat[ing] progress in 
reducing air pollution with economic growth”—153, which constitute the 
permissible factors for consideration.  It is neither controversial nor 
novel to state that any statutory interpretation necessarily entails a 
construction of statute’s purposes, which then constitute at least part of 
the metric against which that interpretation is evaluated.154  The reason 
giving that forms the foundation of judicial review for those 
interpretations that an agency implements through rulemaking or 
adjudicatory processes155 renders obvious the centrality to judicial review 
of the factors an agency considered.156  Such review asks not only 
whether the reasons the agency provided in fact support the interpretation 
rendered, but also whether the agency was permitted to rely upon or even 
consider those reasons provided.  Yet, the centrality to Chevron 
deference of agencies’ statutory derivations of permissible factors for 
                                                            
 149.   Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 150.   The Chevron court does not cite State Farm once in the decision.  Id. 
 151.   The Chevron decision itself only implicitly involved questions of permissible 
considerations in the Court’s “Step Two” analysis.  Id. at 866 (“We hold that the EPA’s definition of 
the term ‘source’ is a permissible construction of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress 
in reducing air pollution with economic growth.” (emphasis added)).  
 152.   Pierce, How Agencies Should Give Meaning, supra note 1, at 204 (characterizing agency 
derivations of permissible factors as the link between policymaking and statutory interpretation, 
ensuring the presence of the former necessitates the presence of the latter); Gersen & Vermeule, 
supra note 6, at 1372–73.  
 153.   Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
 154.   See, e.g., John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 115 (2011). 
 155.   See infra Section III.B. for a discussion of Chevron Step Zero and the ways in which an 
agency implements a particular interpretation implicate the deference with which courts review that 
interpretation.  
 156.   Short, supra note 16, at 1821; Mashaw, supra note 4, at 111, (arguing that reason giving is 
a “protector of judicial review”); Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 19, at 528. 
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consideration has received little direct attention from scholars.157  The 
account that follows attempts to rectify this oversight. 
Courts’ assessment of the reasonability of the agency’s statutory 
interpretation under Chevron Step Two can be reduced to two deferential 
evaluations of administrative action.158  First, and as a precondition to the 
second, an assessment of the reasonability of the agency’s derivation of 
the aims of the statute, which amount to the permissible considerations 
upon which an agency may justify a particular course of action;159 and, 
second, an assessment of whether the agency’s interpretation reasonably 
                                                            
 157.   Academic treatments of Chevron Step Two have generally argued (1) normatively that 
courts should merge Chevron Step Two into arbitrary and capricious review, see Ronald M. Levin, 
The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1997); and, 
(2) descriptively that such a doctrinal development has already occurred. Id. at 1267; Matthew C. 
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 604 (2009) (“We 
have the doctrinal equivalent of musical chairs, with three doctrines (Chevron Step One, Chevron 
Step Two, State Farm) and only two chairs (interpretive reasonableness and reasoned decision-
making).”). Professors Stephenson and Vermeule’s colorful analogy makes clear where this Article’s 
understanding of Chevron diverges from existing scholarship: Chevron Step Two does not compete 
with State Farm, but rather refines a particular kind of review for reasoned decision making, 
specifically in an agency’s decision-making process for arriving at a statutory interpretation of an 
ambiguous authorization.  Accordingly, calls to merge the two doctrines amount to a call for a return 
to the short-lived post-State Farm (1983) but pre-Chevron (1984) era.  While the standards bear 
close resemblance, there are crucial distinctions in that State Farm amounts to “a much stricter and 
more exacting review of the agency’s rationale and decision-making process than the Chevron Step 
Two standard.”  Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 521 (2d 
Cir. 2017) (“[W]e conclude that [the District Court] erred by incorporating the State Farm standard 
into its Chevron Step Two analysis and thereby applying too strict a standard of review.”); Kenneth 
A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 622 (2009).  Chevron 
Step Two is distinct in its “doubly deferential” nature.  The review is doubly deferential in the sense 
that the court reviews deferentially both (1) the agency’s derivation of the statute’s aims and 
permissible factors for consideration, and (2) the agency’s interpretation as mechanism for furthering 
those aims.  Whether the level of deference with which the court reviews (1) from (2) varies marks 
an interesting question for further research, though a likely futile one due to the Court’s general 
ambiguity about what deference entails and the uncommon nature of detailed Chevron Step Two 
analyses.  Dicta from Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 242 
(2001) implies the standards are similar.  Infra notes 159 et seq. 
 158.   To avoid “Chevron Step-counting fatigue”, see, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 758 (2017), it seems unnecessary to 
characterize these two processes as distinct steps.  Rather, they may be best understood as the dual 
processes by which doubly deferential review of statutory interpretation occurs.  
 159.   Justice Breyer’s formulation of the doctrine in Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) 
illustrates that Chevron Step Two amounts to judicial review of the agency’s construction of the 
statutorily permissible factors for consideration upon which the agency justified the challenged 
interpretation.  Justice Breyer characterizes Step Two as an assessment of “whether the 
interpretation, for other reasons, exceeds the bounds of the permissible.”  Id. at 218 (emphasis 
added).  The paragraph of the decision in which Justice Breyer conducts this assessment makes clear 
that the “other reasons” are “the statute’s basic objectives”, rendering Chevron Step Two an 
assessment of whether the agency’s interpretations “makes considerable sense in terms of [those 
objectives]”.  Id. at 219.  
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furthers the identified statutory aims.160  In short, Chevron amounts to a 
doubly-deferential—insofar as reviewing for “reasonability” amounts to 
a deferential standard—review of an agency’s legal interpretations 
because the court grants deference to both (1) the agency’s construction 
of permissible factors for consideration and (2) the agency’s 
interpretation of a contested provision that derives support from the 
permissible factors for consideration.161  Indeed, the premise of Chevron 
deference is that a court will defer to the agency’s expertise-informed 
and relatively more politically accountable perspective for realizing a 
particular set of aims,162 so long as the court agrees that the set of aims an 
agency seeks to realize are a reasonable construal of the set of aims 
contained in the statute that Congress tasked that agency to implement.163  
While the Supreme Court has never expressly identified as distinct these 
two assessments, two things are clear.  First, that both fall under Chevron 
Step Two.  Second, while generally implicit, the assessment of the 
reasonability of the agency’s derivation of the aims of the statute is a 
precondition to an assessment of the reasonability of the agency’s 
interpretation as a means for the realization of those statutory aims. 
In some applications of Chevron deference, the court rejects as 
unreasonable the agency’s derivation of permissible factors for 
consideration.  Michigan v. EPA,164 for example, concerned only whether 
it was reasonable for the EPA to interpret “appropriate and necessary” as 
not requiring consideration of costs at particular stage in the rulemaking 
process.165  In a relatively rare instance of rejecting an agency 
                                                            
 160.   Even if the agency were to derive the statutory objectives—and thus factors for 
consideration—with sufficient accuracy, however, it remains possible for the court to view the 
agency’s interpretation as undermining those statutory aims.  This outcome is highly unlikely 
because of the very reasons the doctrine exists: agency’s comparatively superior expertise and 
political accountability vis-à-vis courts’ counsel against demanding judicial review of an agency’s 
determinations of the interpretation that best fulfills the statutory aims.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 
(1961)) (“The Regulations which the Administrator has adopted provide what the agency could 
allowably view as . . . [an] effective reconciliation of these twofold ends . . . .”). 
 161.   Id. at 842–43.  
 162.   Id. at 865 (“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of 
the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the 
basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has 
delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon 
the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”). 
 163.   Id.  
 164.   135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).  
 165.   Id. at 2704 (“The Clean Air Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate 
emissions of hazardous air pollutants from power plants if the Agency finds regulation ‘appropriate 
and necessary.’  We must decide whether it was reasonable for EPA to refuse to consider cost when 
making this finding.”). 
606 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
interpretation at Chevron Step Two,166 the Justice Scalia-authored bare 
majority in Michigan v. EPA, held that “appropriate and necessary” was 
ambiguous but that the agency’s interpretation disregarding costs was 
unreasonable because “appropriate and necessary” mandated 
consideration of costs.  Accordingly, because the agency unreasonably 
identified the permissible factors for consideration from the statutory 
aims, the Court found it unnecessary to assess whether the agency’s 
interpretation reasonably furthered the permissible considerations or 
statutory aims.  In another demonstration of the centrality of agency’s 
derivation of permissible factors to Chevron Step Two, the majority in 
Lopez v. Davis167 upheld as reasonable both the agency’s derivation of 
those permissible factors for consideration and the interpretation of the 
statute with which the agency furthered those factors.  “By denying 
eligibility to violent offenders, the statute manifests congressional 
concern for preconviction behavior—and for the very conduct leading to 
conviction.  The Bureau may reasonably attend to these factors as 
well.”168 
Lopez and Michigan are the outliers, however.  In most applications 
of Chevron Step Two, the court only implicitly assesses whether the 
agency reasonably derived permissible considerations or statutory aims 
before proceeding to evaluate whether those permissible considerations 
reasonably supported the interpretation promulgated.  In these cases, 
where Chevron Step Two most closely resembles State Farm substantive 
review, the court’s primary assessment is the more technical 
determination of whether the agency’s statutory interpretation furthers 
the implicitly derived statutory purposes.169  In Mayo Foundation for 
Medical Education and Research v. United States, for example, the 
Court held “[t]he Department reasonably determined that taxing residents 
                                                            
 166.   For over a decade after Chevron, “the Court ha[d] never once struck down an agency’s 
interpretation by relying squarely on the second Chevron step . . . when [the Court] utilizes the 
Chevron framework, it either upholds the agency or reverses on the strength of step one.”  Levin, 
supra note 157, at 1261.  
 167.   531 U.S. 230 (2001).  
 168.   Id. at 242 (emphasis added).  For a similar decision outside the context of Chevron, see 
INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30–31 (1996) (“Unlike the prior version of the waiver-of-deportation 
statute . . . under which the Attorney General had no discretion to deny a waiver if the statutory 
requirements were met, satisfaction of the requirements under § 1251(a)(1)(H), including the 
requirement that the alien have been ‘otherwise admissible,’ establishes only the alien’s eligibility 
for the waiver. Such eligibility in no way limits the considerations that may guide the Attorney 
General in exercising her discretion to determine who, among those eligible, will be accorded 
grace.” (emphasis added)).  
 169.   But see Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 157, at 606, for the ways in which these 
doctrines diverge. 
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under FICA would further the purpose of the Social Security Act”, 
without explicitly reviewing the agency’s construction of the purpose of 
the Social Security Act.170  In Whitman v. American Trucking Assn, the 
Court held that EPA’s interpretation implementing a provision of the 
Clean Air Act could not withstand Chevron Step Two review because the 
interpretation was “so at odds with [the statute’s] manifest purpose.”171  
In most instances in which the Supreme Court reaches Chevron Step 
Two, the Court’s approach more closely resembles Mayo and Whitman 
than Lopez or Michigan.  Review of the initial statutory construction for 
purpose or permissible factors remains largely implicit, and the circuit 
court decisions to have explicitly addressed the question provide little 
clarification.172 
These Supreme Court rulings make clear that Chevron Step Two will 
continue to provide the standard by which courts review agency’s 
                                                            
 170.   562 U.S. 44, 59 (2011). 
 171.   531 U.S. 457, 485–86 (2001).  The uncertainty over whether the Court held to be 
unreasonable EPA’s construction of statutorily permissible factors for consideration or the 
interpretation as a mechanism for realizing the aims articulated in those factors is illustrative of a 
more general uncertainty surrounding Chevron Step Two.  Other aspects of the Court’s complex 
ruling in American Trucking more explicitly implicate agency’s derivations of permissible factors 
for consideration.  Id. at 469 (rejecting American Trucking Associations’ claim that the agency may 
consider costs even if the statute did not include costs in the enumerated permissible considerations 
because “[t]hat factor is both so indirectly related to public health [the enumerated permissible 
consideration] and so full of potential for canceling the conclusions drawn from direct health effects 
that it would surely have been expressly mentioned  . . . had Congress meant it to be considered.” 
(emphasis in original)).  The unique posture of American Trucking—where the respondent sought 
judicial review to force the agency to consider an unenumerated but potentially permissible factor—
rendered irrelevant Chevron deference to this question.  While the court only needed to find that the 
statute did not mandate consideration of costs, the language quoted above strongly implies that had 
the agency considered costs, the court would have found that interpretation of the statute 
unreasonable under Chevron Step Two. 
 172.   Professor Pierce, Facts an Agency Can Consider, supra note 1, at 73, praises the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach of concluding “that Congress has forbidden an agency from considering a 
logically relevant decisional factor only when ‘there is clear congressional intent’ to preclude agency 
consideration of the factor.”  But see Bluestone Energy Design, Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 74 F.3d 1288, 
1294–95 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Because the Commission’s power to assess penalties comes from 
Congress, the Commission can consider only those factors that Congress has specified . . . . Because 
the Federal Power Act does not directly address the propriety of considering staff time and 
resources, we turn to the second step of Chevron, testing for reasonableness the Commission’s view 
that use of staff time and resources is relevant to the statutory factors . . . . and we do not find 
persuasive the ALJ’s explanation.”). The Fifth Circuit’s approach is similarly muddled.  Luminant 
Generation Co., L.L.C. v. EPA, 675 F.3d 917, 926 (5th Cir. 2012), for example, suggests a statutory-
supremacy approach: “It is beyond cavil that the EPA may consider only the requirements of the 
CAA when reviewing SIP submissions.”  In other cases, however, the Fifth Circuit employs a far 
more deferential test borrowed from its elucidation of State Farm review: “the scope of the 
reviewing court’s inquiry is to determine if the agency’s judgment conforms to minimum standards 
of rationality, i.e., whether the agency act bears a rational relationship to the statutory purposes, and 
whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support it.”  ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, 612 
F.3d 822, 832 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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derivation of statutory permissible factors, so long as the conditions 
discussed in the following Section are met, and the agency’s derivation 
of those factors will continue to inform the second evaluation that occurs 
under Chevron Step Two, whether the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable in light of the permissible factors for consideration.  Even if 
commentators have overstated the impact of Chevron deference,173 both 
empirical studies174 and the tremendous time and effort expended by the 
Supreme Court over the conditions under which Chevron deference 
applies175 strongly imply a continued significance attached to Chevron 
deference.  Facially, at least, Chevron Step Two is undeniably more 
deferential than its alternative,176 Skidmore persuasiveness deference,177 
and its availability is often enough dispositive in judicial review of 
agency action.178 
B. Chevron’s Domain: Step Zero, the Force of the Law, and Chevron-
Eligibility 
With the enhanced level of deference Chevron provides to the 
administrative actions that fall within its domain,179 increased attention 
has fallen on the conditions under which agency actions receive Chevron 
deference.180  The remaining sections of this Article examine the doctrine 
                                                            
 173.   Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An 
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 
(2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 
(2008) (concluding “there has not been a Chevron ‘revolution’ at the Supreme Court level.”). 
 174.   Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (1990). 
 175.   See infra Section III.B. 
 176.   Schuck & Elliot, supra note 174.  
 177.   Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of 
Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1137–46 (2001) (reading Skidmore as a heightened form 
of reasonableness review); Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What 
Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1896–1906 (2006); Kristin E. Hickman & 
Mathew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1271–
80 (2007) (arguing that courts have inexpertly applied a Skidmore deference along a continuum).  
 178.   See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 314 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“When it applies, Chevron is a powerful weapon in an agency’s regulatory arsenal.”). 
 179.   Throughout this Section, Chevron’s domain refers to the conditions under which Chevron 
applies.  The phrase originates with Merrill & Hickman’s influential article, Chevron’s Domain, 
supra note 144, which was cited affirmatively by the Court in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218 (2001), the case most frequently associated with demarcations of Chevron’s domain.  This 
Section uses the phrase interchangeably with Chevron Step Zero, another phrase encompassing 
courts’ assessments of conditions under which an agency’s legal interpretation receives Chevron 
deference.  Sunstein, supra note 65.   
 180.   Sunstein, supra note 65, at 187.  
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currently conditioning agency access to Chevron deference, and then 
argue for a reformulation of that doctrine.  Initially, Chevron applied to 
any agency’s interpretations of an ambiguous statute.181  In 1984, at least, 
the manner in which an agency interpreted that ambiguous statutory 
provision had little relevance to the question of whether the judiciary 
would grant deference to that interpretation.  The lack of emphasis on the 
administrative process the agency employed to interpret an ambiguous 
provision reflected the emphasis on the possible justifications for 
Chevron deference provided by Justice Stevens in his majority 
opinion.182  While no doubt significant,183 Congressional intent seems to 
occupy a role of secondary importance relative to concerns for political 
accountability and agency expertise.184  The narrowing of Chevron’s 
domain that follows thus tracks the narrowing of the court’s justification 
for granting Chevron deference, as congressional intent has displaced 
political accountability and expertise.185 
Both scholars and jurists have shifted the emphasis of justifications 
for Chevron deference from expressly normative claims for presidential 
control as a mechanism of political accountability186 to claims about the 
merits of the doctrine as a tool to derive congressional intent.187  The 
                                                            
 181.   Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). (“First, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 
 182.   Id. at 866 (emphasizing the political accountability justifications for Chevron deference by 
arguing that “federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy 
choices made by those who do”).   
 183.   As reflected in Chevron Step One.  Id.  
 184.   Id. (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly 
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a 
reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal 
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those 
who do.”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1765 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Procedures as Politics]; Kagan & Barron, supra 
note 54, at 213. 
 185.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2373; Kagan & Barron, supra note 54, at 212 (“Mead represents 
the apotheosis of a developing trend in Chevron cases: the treatment of Chevron as a congressional 
choice, rather than either a constitutional mandate or a judicial doctrine.”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 
569 U.S. 290, 321–22 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Adams Fruit, Mead, and Gonzales thus 
confirm that Chevron deference is based on, and finds legitimacy as, a congressional delegation of 
interpretive authority. An agency interpretation warrants such deference only if Congress has 
delegated authority to definitively interpret a particular ambiguity in a particular manner.”). 
 186.   Id.  But see Strauss, supra note 15, at 752 (“To make Chevron turn entirely on presidential 
politics is to omit consideration of the role of “reasonableness” in relation to those matters found to 
fall within the area of discretion constituting “step two” of its analysis.”). 
 187.   Sunstein, supra note 65, at 192 (noting that both views of Chevron holding sway over the 
Supreme Court “converged . . . on a distinctive understanding of Chevron, one that roots the decision 
in a theory of implicit congressional delegation of law-interpreting power to administrative agencies.  
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latter claim emerges in a self-fulfilling manner from the doctrine’s 
prominence.  The doctrine’s merit as an interpretive presumption relies at 
least in part upon congressional knowledge that courts will grant 
agencies’ statutory constructions deference, a knowledge that courts can 
presume Congress possesses with increasing certainty so long as 
Chevron deference remains in place.188  This circularity offers a partial 
explanation for the development of the justifications for the Chevron 
doctrine: first grounded in the normative claims necessary to establish 
the doctrine as a productive interpretive presumption and only later 
emphasized as an accurate method for deriving congressional intent once 
courts could reasonably claim that Congress, with knowledge of the 
doctrine, intended to implicitly delegate through ambiguity. 
Three cases, cumulatively referred to as “Chevron Step Zero”,189 
mark this transition to congressional intent as the dominant justification 
for Chevron deference.190  First is Christensen v. Harris County, holding 
that opinion letters issued by the Acting Administration of the Wage and 
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, “like interpretations 
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law[,] do not warrant Chevron 
style deference.”191  Later, the majority added a second consideration, the 
process by which the agency enacted the relevant statutory interpretation, 
with the implication that the court was more willing to apply Chevron 
deference when the agency issued its interpretation following somewhat 
                                                            
Both [views] explicitly recognized that any understanding of legislative instructions is a ‘legal 
fiction’ . . . .”); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 144, at 836.  
 188.   Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
901, 995 (2013) (arguing that Chevron is a feedback canon). 
 189.   Sunstein, supra note 65.  
 190.   Whether these cases required this transition remains unresolved.  It is possible, if not 
inevitable, that agencies both exercise their technical expertise to a greater extent and act with 
greater political accountability when implementing statutory interpretations through actions with the 
force of law.  The Supreme Court, however, declined to pursue these justifications when narrowing 
the domain of Chevron, perhaps wisely.  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 65, at 248 (“These 
restrictions on the reach of Chevron create a great deal of complexity, and in a way that disregards 
the best justifications for the deference rule. The Court seems to have opted for standards over rules 
in precisely the context in which rules make most sense: numerous and highly repetitive decisions in 
which little accuracy is to be gained by a more particularized approach.”). 
 191.   Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (emphasis added).  Justice Scalia 
dissented, arguing that Chevron Step Zero should be limited to a question of whether the challenged 
interpretation “represents the authoritative view of the Department of Labor”, and, if so, then should 
be entitled to Chevron deference.  Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  In Christensen, Justice Scalia found sufficient the fact that the Solicitor of Labor 
cosigned the Solicitor General’s brief that articulated the agency’s statutory interpretation to 
establish that interpretation represented the agency’s “authoritative view.”  Id. 
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formal procedures.192  While Justice Thomas’ majority opinion in 
Christensen provided no explanation for this revision of Chevron,193 
Justice Breyer wrote separately in dissent to argue that the role of 
congressional intent as a justification for the initial, decidedly-un-
revolutionary194 Chevron decision supports the narrowing of Chevron’s 
domain “where one has doubt that Congress actually intended to delegate 
interpretive authority to the agency.”195 
If Christensen can be read to “suggest[] a clean line between 
                                                            
 192.   Id. at 586–87 (majority opinion) (“In Chevron, we held that a court must give effect to an 
agency’s regulation containing a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Here, however, 
we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a 
formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.” (citations omitted)). 
 193.   Id. at 587–88.  The paragraph explaining the majority’s decision not to grant Chevron 
deference to the Department of Labor’s interpretation provides no justification for this decision 
beyond citations to the following three cases: Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1991), EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256–58 
(1991), and Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995).  In Martin, the court declined to grant deference 
to “agency ‘litigating positions’” because these interpretations “occur after agency proceedings have 
terminated” and thus “do not constitute an exercise of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”  
Martin, 499 U.S. at 156.  Justice Marshall’s opinion, however, provided no explanation for why only 
statutory interpretations implemented through exercises of “the agency’s delegated lawmaking 
powers” are entitled to receive Chevron deference, instead “emphasiz[ing] the narrowness of [the] 
holding” dealing “only with the division of powers between the Secretary and the Commission under 
the OSH Act.”  Id. at 157.  In Arabian American Oil, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion 
applies Skidmore deference without addressing Chevron.  Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. at 256–
58.  Justice Scalia’s concurrence reads Rehnquist’s opinion as relying upon a doctrinal anachronism 
granting minimal deference to the EEOC’s statutory interpretations, a characterization the majority 
opinion does not expressly repudiate.  Id. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment).  Finally, the language in Reno seems to run counter to the proposition for which Justice 
Thomas cites it; the relevant paragraph of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion cites Chevron 
to support the Court’s application of “some deference” to BOP’s interpretation.  Reno, 515 U.S. at 
61.  See also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 144, at 846 (“Unfortunately, the majority did not 
explain why having the force of law should mark the dividing line between interpretations entitled to 
Chevron deference and those entitled to Skidmore deference.  The distinction was presented as a 
restatement of precedent but was not linked in any way to the underlying premises of the Chevron 
doctrine.”). 
 194.   Sunstein, supra note 65, at 198–202.  
 195.   Christensen, 529 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas’s reluctance to 
embrace Justice Breyer’s emphasis on congressional intent as the mechanism for distinguishing the 
Chevron-eligible from the Chevron-ineligible may be read as a recognition of the complications 
accompanying such emphasis.  While the “force of law” test provides a relatively clean bright line 
for determining Chevron eligibility, it may not be the most accurate indication of congressional 
intent, as the Court recognized a year later in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 
(2001) (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that 
procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron 
deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.”).  For 
the Supreme Court to follow the logic of Justice Breyer’s dissent, as it will in Mead and Barnhart, 
infra notes 205 et seq., the Court would have to sacrifice the possibility of a bright line test in favor 
of a case-by-case approach.  See Sunstein, supra note 65, at 208; Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of 
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986). 
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Chevron cases and Skidmore cases, turning on the ‘force of law’ test,”196 
of which the agency’s authority to act with formal procedures is a crucial 
indication, the Supreme Court’s next foray into Chevron’s domain 
significantly complicated the picture.  Only a term later, the Supreme 
Court in Mead v. United States seemed to elevate to controlling law the 
Step Zero assessment of whether (1) Congress intended to delegate 
authority to the agency to interpret statutory ambiguities with agency 
actions “carrying the force of the law,”197 and (2) whether “the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”198  This newfound emphasis on the role of congressional 
intent in Chevron deference closely tracks Justice Breyer’s Christensen 
dissent, which the Mead court cited affirmatively199 and which 
commentators read as inspiring the Mead majority.200 
By emphasizing the role of congressional intent in Chevron Step 
Zero and, perhaps more importantly, seeking to more closely 
approximate that intent, the Court in Mead blurred the boundaries 
demarcating Chevron’s domain.  Where the Christensen court seemed 
able to ask only whether the agency acted “with the force of law”201 the 
Mead opinion is “best read” to permit “deference even when (a) an 
agency is not using formal procedures, and (b) an agency’s actions lack 
the force of law”202 so long as there exists some other relevant metric of 
congressional intent for agency’s statutory interpretations to receive 
deference and the agency implemented the relevant interpretation in a 
manner that reflected Congress’s intent.  Mead purported to provide 
some of those other indicia of congressional intent:203 whether the agency 
promulgates the interpretation through “the legislative type of activity 
that would naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling”,204 whether 
                                                            
 196.   Sunstein, supra note 65, at 216.  
 197.   Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.  
 198.   Id.  
 199.   Id. at 230 (citing Justice Breyer’s Christensen dissent for the proposition that “where it is 
in doubt that Congress actually intended to delegate particular interpretive authority to an agency, 
Chevron, is ‘inapplicable.’”). 
 200.   Sunstein, supra note 65, at 214 (describing the majority’s logic as “closely following 
Justice Breyer’s position . . . .”). 
 201.   Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 202.   Sunstein, supra note 65, at 216. 
 203.   Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 (“The authorization for classification rulings, and Customs’s 
practice in making them, present a case far removed not only from notice-and-comment process, but 
from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification 
rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them here.”). 
 204.   Id. at 232.  
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the agency action “may be precedent in later transactions”,205 whether 
there exist “provisions for independent review” of the action with which 
the agency promulgates the relevant interpretation,206 whether the agency 
“ever set out with a lawmaking pretense in mind”,207 and whether the 
agency action is unique or one of “10,000 to 15,000 of them each 
year.”208  The Mead majority provided little guidance for future courts to 
weigh these factors, as noted in Justice Scalia’s dissent,209 requiring what 
amounts to a case-by-case examination of the totality of the 
circumstances to arrive at a judicial construction of congressional 
intent.210 
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court in Barnhart v. Walton211 
                                                            
 205.   Id.  The Court, however, notes that “precedential value alone does not add up to Chevron 
entitlement; interpretive rules may sometimes function as precedents [] and they enjoy no Chevron 
status as a class.”  Id.  
 206.   Id.  The existence of independent review in Mead seems to counsel against Chevron-
eligibility.  Id. (“In any event, any precedential claim of a classification ruling is counterbalanced by 
the provision for independent review of Customs classifications by the CIT.”). 
 207.   Id. at 233. 
 208.   Id.  Other factors, added in Mead’s progeny, include whether the agency interpretation 
involves “unusually basic legal questions.”  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).  Never one to miss the opportunity to 
explicate his preferred understanding of Chevron, Justice Breyer provided further elucidation in his 
concurrence in City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 309 (2013).  Justice Breyer noted the Mead 
force of law test, the Barnhart passage discussed infra notes 205 et seq., “the subject matter of the 
relevant provision—for instance, its distance from the agency’s ordinary statutory duties or its 
falling within the scope of another agency’s authority,” “the statute’s text, its context, the structure 
of the statutory scheme”, and “legislative and regulatory history.”  Id.  Justice Breyer acknowledges 
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the case-by-case approach but argues such an approach best 
approximates “how Congress would likely have meant to allocate interpretive law-determining 
authority between reviewing court and agency.”  Id. at 310.  
 209.   Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has largely replaced Chevron, in 
other words, with that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by 
litigants who want to know what to expect): th’ ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”); Barron & 
Kagan, supra note 54, at 210–11 (“Though the opinion refrained from cataloguing these indicators, 
it suggested that chief among them is the degree of procedural formality involved in the action.”).  
While procedural formality may provide something of a safe-haven, id. at 214, agency’s increasing 
reliance upon informal processes renders significant the question of judicial deference to agency 
interpretations promulgated through such means.  Juan J. Lavilla, The “Good Cause” Exemption to 
Notice and Comment Rulemaking Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. 
L.J. 317, 339–40 nn.86–87 (1989). 
 210.   Not inaccurately, Justice Scalia forecasted “protracted confusion.”  Mead, 533 U.S. at 245 
(Scalia, J. dissenting).  The majority’s rebuttal noted that anything but a case-by-case approach 
would “declare[] irrelevant or minimize[]” the extensive “diversity of statutes authorizing 
discretionary administrative action.”  Id. at 236.  The majority continued, “it is simply implausible 
that Congress intended such a broad range of statutory authority to produce only two varieties of 
administration action, demanding either Chevron deference or none at all.” Id. 
 211.   Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) solidified this development, rendering “the real 
[Step Zero] question” whether “Congress’s (implied) instructions in the particular statutory scheme” 
demand deference to the agency’s construction of an ambiguous statutory mandate or authorization.  
Sunstein, supra note 65, at 218. 
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marked the apotheosis of this approach.212  Despite the fact that the 
Social Security Administration adopted a particular interpretation 
through “means less formal than ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking”,213 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion concluded that all the relevant factors 
indicated the SSA’s interpretation was Chevron-eligible.214  The 
Barnhart and Mead majorities provided what amounts to a grab bag of 
indicators to determine whether Congress intended agencies’ legal 
interpretations to receive deference, with only ambiguous connections 
between the indicators and congressional intent.215  Unsurprisingly, lower 
courts have taken the Supreme Court up on this offer, grasping 
inconsistently at the various considerations offered by the Barnhart and 
Mead courts.216  Studies of Step Zero in the circuit courts initially 
revealed courts’ inability to reconcile Barnhart and Mead,217 with each 
circuit selecting one of either Barnhart or Mead to apply and thus 
binding the circuit to the approach embodied therein,218 followed by a 
general reluctance on the part of lower federal courts to resolve 
challenges to agency interpretations by reference to Step Zero.219  At 
best, then, the multi-factor analysis constituting Step Zero is an 
intellectual exercise so incoherent as to be ignored by lower courts, 
relevant only in the briefing of those rare challenges to agency 
interpretations adjudicated by the Supreme Court.220  At worst, Step Zero 
provides a grab bag in which courts may calibrate deference according to 
masked policy preferences.  If the “genius of the Chevron doctrine” 
resides, as suggested by Professor Manning, in “its simplicity”,221 there 
                                                            
 212.   Sunstein, supra note 65 at 216 (characterizing Barnhart as “Justice Breyer’s triumph.”). 
 213.   Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221.  
 214.   Id.  Justice Breyer explained that “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related 
expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statue, the 
complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question 
over a long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through 
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation . . . .”  Id. at 222. 
 215.   But see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional 
Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009 (2011). 
 216.   Bressman, How Mead has Muddled, supra note 71, at 1446; Sunstein, supra note 65, at 
222; Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 347 
(2003) (analogizing the D.C. Circuit’s implementation of the Mead doctrine to “the line officers and 
soldiers who fought in the trenches at Verdun and the Somme [] put in an untenable position by 
generals who hadn’t sufficiently accounted for the structural conditions of modern warfare”). 
 217.   See Bressman, How Mead has Muddled, supra note 71.   
 218.   Id. 
 219.   Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 69 (2017) (suggesting that the factors constituting Barnhart Step Zero’s multi-factor analysis 
“may be doing silent work in the circuit courts’ decisionmaking after a step-zero inquiry”). 
 220.   Id. at 67. 
 221.   John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1518 
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cannot remain much genius in a doctrine that no longer provides a simple 
or even consistent answer to the question of when a reviewing court 
should defer to an agency’s legal interpretation. 
C. Reimagining Chevron’s Domain: Agency Independence 
To resolve the confusion created by the Chevron Step Zero trilogy, 
this Section argues for replacing the standards222 formulated in Mead, 
Christensen, Barnhart, and their progeny with a rule that conditions an 
agency’s ability to access Chevron deference upon that agency’s 
independence from presidential control.  In so doing, courts should 
review with greater deference an executive agency’s interpretation of a 
statute that Congress tasked that agency with implementing than an 
interpretation made by a similarly positioned independent agency.223  To 
advance this claim, this Section proceeds in three directions.  First, it is 
necessary to mark the parameters of this reimagined Chevron Step Zero 
and define the relevant metrics of agency independence.  Second, this 
Section makes the normative case for this approach, arguing that 
deference contingent upon agency independence better approximates 
                                                            
(2014). 
 222.   While the vast rules-standards debate provides one avenue for criticizing existing Chevron 
Step Zero jurisprudence, an approach favored by Justice Scalia in his dissents and concurrences to 
the Step Zero trilogy, that is not the approach favored here. For more on the rules-standards debate, 
see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).  
 223.   This proposal is not new.  Outside the context of Chevron, Justice Breyer’s dissent in FCC 
v. Fox, 556 U.S. at 547, argued that courts should more closely review independent agency 
determinations.  Randolph May twice argued for “differential deference”, claiming concerns for 
political accountability should encourage courts to provide greater deference to executive agencies 
than to independent agencies.  May, Defining Deference Down, supra note 69; May, Defining 
Deference Down, Again, supra note 69.  Kagan, supra note 10 and Barron & Kagan supra note 54, 
argue that deference should be contingent upon the level of presidential involvement in 
administration and, indeed, her arguments form the basis for the majority of May’s claims.  
Professor Sharkey, supra note 49, argues for “harder look” review for independent agencies.  See 
also David M. Gossett, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of 
Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 689 n.40 (1997) (noting that the “separation of powers” rationale 
for Chevron “would imply that independent agencies might not deserve Chevron deference”).  None 
of these proposals, however, advance their claims in the context of Chevron Step Zero.  
Accordingly, this Article departs from prior proposals in arguing that (1) the delegatee-agency’s 
degree of insulation from presidential control provides the best approximation of congressional 
intent regarding the allocation of what Justice Breyer calls “interpretive law-determining authority 
between reviewing court and agency,” City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. at 310 (Breyer, J., 
concurring), and should thus replace the existing factors evaluated under Chevron Step Zero; and, 
(2) the primary justification for such a recalibrated deference regime lies not in the president as a 
source of political accountability, but rather the president as source of extra-statutory factors upon 
which agencies often rely. 
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congressional intent, enhances political accountability, and encourages 
the exercise of agency expertise.  Third, this Section surveys potential 
criticisms of this reformulated Step Zero, and responses to those 
criticisms.  While there no doubt exists problems with the reformulated 
Step Zero proposed here, this approach better balances approximations of 
congressional intent, concerns for political accountability of 
administration, expertise-forcing, and judicial administrability than the 
current Step Zero. 
1. Defining Agency Independence 
Before advancing the normative case for differential deference224 
contingent upon the degree of independence enjoyed by the agency 
receiving the relevant delegation,225 it is necessary to define and identify 
the appropriate level(s) of agency independence at which deference 
should be withheld.  Despite the frequency with which independent 
agencies are invoked, neither courts226 nor scholars227 have settled upon a 
definition of agency independence.  Without a clear definition, ideally 
endorsed by Congress given the centrality of congressional intent to 
Chevron deference, conditioning an agency’s access to Chevron 
deference upon that agency lacking independence from the executive 
branch would replicate the confusion under Chevron Step Zero’s existing 
multi-factor analysis. 
Fortunately, Congress, in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980228 
                                                            
 224.   The phrase “differential deference” originates with May, Defining Deference Down, 
Again, supra note 69, at 440.  Throughout, differential deference refers to distinct levels of deference 
contingent upon the relevant agency’s independence, rather than, for example, deference contingent 
upon the reviewing court’s place in the Article III hierarchy.  See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727 (2013). 
 225.   Hereinafter, the “delegate.” 
 226.   Compare PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“An agency is considered 
‘independent’ when the agency heads are removable by the President only for cause, not at will, and 
therefore are not supervised or directed by the President.”) with Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S 477, 547 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Agency independence 
is a function of several different factors . . . . Those factors include, inter alia, an agency’s separate 
(rather than presidentially dependent) budgeting authority, its separate litigating authority, its 
composition as a multimember bipartisan board, the use of the word ‘independent’ in its authorizing 
statute, and, above all, a political environment, reflecting tradition and function, that would impose a 
heavy political cost upon any President who tried to remove a commissioner of the agency without 
cause.” (emphasis added)).  
 227.   See generally Datla & Revesz, supra note 66, at 772 (concluding that “[a]gencies cannot 
be neatly divided into two categories” but instead exist upon a continuum of independence evinced 
by a number of indicia); Vermeule, supra note 69, at 1174–75; Kagan, supra note 10, at 2376. 
 228.   Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012).  The Act allows 
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(“PRA”), provided a definitive list of independent agencies.229  While 
commentators have criticized Congress’s list as imprecise,230 so long as 
the court primarily justifies Chevron deference by reference to 
congressional intent, only Congress’s classifications of independent 
agencies hold relevance.  Rather than weighing a number of factors that 
the court seems to recognize are only tangentially related to Congress’s 
intended allocation of interpretive authority between administrative 
agencies and the judiciary, courts would grant Chevron deference only to 
those interpretations of statutes that Congress tasked an executive agency 
with implementing. 
Even absent the clear statement of congressional intent contained in 
the PRA, it would be far easier for courts to derive Congress’s intent to 
insulate an agency from presidential control in an authorizing statute—a 
real consideration of Congress’s when creating new delegations231—than 
it has been for courts to derive Congress’s intent regarding the allocation 
of interpretive authority between courts and agencies232—a legislative 
component that Congress is unlikely to consider much less 
authoritatively resolve.233  In other words, although both the factors 
                                                            
“independent regulatory agenc[ies]” with two or more members to override the OMB’s 
informational request vetoes.  44 U.S.C. § 3507(f)(1) (2012). 
 229.   In the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Congress characterized the following agencies as 
independent: “the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Mine Enforcement Safety and Health 
Review Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the Postal Regulatory Commission, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the Office of 
Financial Research, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and any other similar agency 
designated by statute as a Federal independent regulatory agency or commission.”  44 U.S.C. § 
3502(5) (2012). 
 230.   See, e.g., Datla & Revesz, supra note 66, at 781, n.65. 
 231.   Barkow, supra note 66, at 20.  
 232.   Barnett & Walker, supra note 219, at 66–67.  Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the 
Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2050 (2011) [hereinafter 
Reclaiming the Legal Fiction] (arguing “there is direct evidence that Congress attends to the 
delegation of interpretive authority when it writes statutory language”). 
 233.   Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of 
Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1212–13 (1990) (“Like other interpretive regimes, 
the Supreme Court’s approach in Chevron is premised on a series of fictions. The Court concluded 
that agencies should have the dominant role in interpreting ambiguous agency-administered statutes 
because: (1) Congress has delegated this power to agencies; and (2) the politically accountable 
President will control those policy decisions Congress has declined to make through his control over 
the agencies. Both premises are fictional in most cases.”).  Cf. Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal 
Fiction, supra note 232, at 2050 (“The Court applies a presumption of legislative intent and draws an 
inference of legislative intent that corresponds to the political science account of how Congress 
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composing the Mead/Barnhart analysis and the indicators of agency 
independence courts would evaluate absent the PRA approximate 
congressional intent, the latter notion of congressional intent exists 
whereas the former is widely-acknowledged as a legal fiction.234 
2. The Normative Defense 
The normative argument for conditioning Chevron eligibility on an 
agency’s independence proceeds in the context of the three 
considerations identified as justifications for Chevron deference by the 
Chevron court and its successors.  First, and most prominent given the 
development in the Supreme Court’s justification for Chevron 
deference,235 is congressional intent.  The Supreme Court recognizes that 
its multi-factor analysis under Chevron Step Zero intends only to 
approximate congressional intent regarding the allocation of interpretive 
authority between courts and agencies, and the delegatee-agency’s 
independence provides a better approximation of congressional intent 
than do the factors upon which the court currently relies. 
The Supreme Court has yet to provide any explanation for why its 
current multi-factor Step Zero analysis can accurately assess whether 
Congress sought to allocate greater “interpretive law determining power” 
to the agency tasked with implementing the relevant statute than to the 
judiciary.236  The question this proposal raises for Chevron Step Zero is 
whether the type of agency action with which the relevant agency 
implements its statutory authorization is a better approximation of 
Congress’s delegation of interpretive authority than is the type of agency 
receiving the delegation.  If, as argued in Section III.A, Chevron 
deference should be understood as a doctrine governing an agency’s 
construction of the statutorily permissible factors for consideration,237 
                                                            
decides to delegate.”).  
 234.   Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1449–64 (2007).  
 235.   See, e.g., all three opinions—Justice Scalia’s majority, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, and 
Chief Justice Robert’s dissent—in City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013); id. at 308–09 
(Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 313–15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 236.   See Sunstein, supra note 65, at 196; Breyer, supra note 195, at 370, (characterizing the 
Chevron presumption as “a kind of legal fiction.”).  Recent empirical analysis of congressional 
drafting has attempted to supplement the Court’s claims.  See Bressman, supra note 232, at 2050; 
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 188, at 994 (“Mead, despite abundant criticism, is more rooted in our 
respondents’ drafting practice than any other canon in our study except perhaps Chevron.”); 
Christopher J. Walker, Insider Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1063 (2015). 
 237.   Supra Section III.A, arguing this question is central, either explicitly or implicitly, to 
courts’ application of Chevron Step Two.  
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including extra-statutory factors such as presidential direction,238 then it 
follows that the degree of insulation from presidential control enjoyed by 
the agency receiving the relevant delegation indicates Congress’s 
intentions regarding the President’s capacity to dictate extra-statutory 
factors for the agency to consider when implementing its statutory 
authorization. 
This claim relies upon the following two assumptions: (1) that 
Congress intends to subject executive agencies to greater presidential 
control than independent agencies,239 and (2) presidential direction is one 
prominent source of extra-statutory considerations.240  The second 
assumption, while not axiomatic in the manner of the first, finds 
considerable support in historical practice.  Every presidential 
administration since Reagan has required that executive agencies perform 
cost-benefit analysis of all economically significant regulatory rules 
under consideration,241 so long as the delegating statute does not prohibit 
such analysis.242  That cost-benefit analysis is then subject to executive 
                                                            
 238.   Most prominently in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534–35 (“We need not and do not 
reach the question whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy 
concerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 843–844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694, 
at 1.”). 
 239.   Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (holding that independent 
agencies “cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive.  Its 
duties are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute, must be free 
from executive control.”); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 
DUKE L. J. 257, 267–68 (1988); Barkow, supra note 66, at 17.  Even if presidential control of 
independent agencies has increased since the 1930s, most prominently in appointments and the 
development of independent agency’s broader policy goals, see, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & 
Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600 (2010); Neal 
Devins & David Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of 
Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2008); Martin Shapiro, A Comparison of US and 
European Independent Agencies, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 293, 298 (Susan Rose-
Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010); Vermeule, supra note 69, at 1203 (there indisputably 
remain powerful conventions of agency independence that restrict presidential direction of specific 
agency actions).  
 240.   Datla & Revesz, supra note 66, at 777 (arguing that, historically, independent agencies 
were intended “to allow the new agencies to focus on narrow subject areas without consideration of 
competing programmatic interests.”).  Barkow, supra note 66, at 19–21. 
 241.   President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which established executive oversight, 
specifically vested in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, of agency rulemakings based 
on cost-benefit analysis.  Both Bush Administrations, the Clinton Administration, and Obama 
Administration maintained this basic structure.  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 
17, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); Exec. Order 13,563, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011).  See also Sharkey supra note 49, at 1620–21 (explaining that executive 
branch agencies “have been required by executive order to conduct cost-benefit analyses for most, if 
not all, of their economically significant rules since the Reagan Administration”). 
 242.   Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that the Clean Air Act 
did not permit EPA to employ cost-benefit analysis when regulating). 
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review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”), in 
effect introducing the President’s assessment of a regulation’s costs and 
benefits into agency decision-making.243  Quite literally, then, the 
President through executive order has mandated that agencies consider 
extra-statutory factors and, at least in the D.C. Circuit, an agency’s 
reliance upon those executive orders provides sufficient justification for 
an administrative outcome.244  Indeed, the very premise of upon which 
proponents of presidential administration rely is that the president 
possesses the unique capacity to synchronize and energize administration 
through the introduction of extra-statutory factors for consideration.245 
Operating under these assumptions, courts should assume a more 
deferential position toward executive agency’s derivations of permissible 
factors for consideration than those of an independent agency to ensure 
that presidential direction has not altered an agency action over which 
Congress did not intend the President to exert control.  Chevron 
deference provides the most significant mechanism with which courts 
facilitate presidential control of administration.246  Accordingly, courts 
should be reluctant to grant such deference to agencies Congress 
expressly sought to place outside the President’s reach, especially so 
long as the Supreme Court justifies that deference primarily by reference 
                                                            
 243.   Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 22 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 575, 582 (2015) (detailing the OIRA process for supervising executive 
agencies, including the process by which OIRA “ensures that the proposed regulations are consistent 
with president’s overall policy objectives.”).  Claims that OIRA review provides the President with a 
mechanism for introducing political calculations into administrative processes dates back to the 
agency’s formation.  See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 41, at 69, (observing “charges that [OIRA] 
wields undue political influence” due to “the connection through OMB to the White House.”).  For 
more sympathetic portrayals of OIRA and the rise of cost-benefit analysis in the administrative state, 
see, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 
(2002).  
 244.   Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that “NIH [an agency of 
the Department of Health and Human Services] may not simply disregard an Executive Order.”).  
Some scholars have, appropriately, criticized Sherley as standing for the proposition that an 
executive policy choice can insulate an agency from both the notice and comment process and 
judicial review of the substantive and procedural efficacy of that process.  See Nicholas Bagley, 
Sherley You’re Joking, NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 22, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/sherley-youre-
joking/ [https://perma.cc/PV6S-NYK6].  Here, however, Sherley need only be read for the narrower 
proposition that within a range of statutorily permissible interpretations, the executive’s policy 
preference may be dispositive.  Dicta in Sherley supports this interpretation.  Sherley, 689 F.3d at 
784 (“[A]s an agency under the direction of the executive branch, [NIH] must implement the 
President’s policy directives to the extent permitted by law.” (emphasis added)). 
 245.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2339.   
 246.   Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 
YALE L.J. 2580, 2581 (2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has legitimated the executive’s power of 
interpretation, above all in Chevron.”); Watts, Proposing a Place, supra note 15.  Kagan, supra note 
10, at 2372. 
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to congressional intent. 
Second is the concern for political accountability that initially 
appeared to motivate the Chevron doctrine.247  To the extent that the 
Supreme Court still finds an agency’s political accountability relevant to 
provision of deference to that agency’s legal determinations,248 
conditioning the provision of that deference upon an agency’s insulation 
from presidential control would better promote a politically accountable 
administration.  Conditioning deference in this way facilitates 
presidential control of executive agency decisions and congressional 
control—in the form of adherence to an agency’s statutory mandate or 
authorization—of independent agencies.249  Justice Scalia’s plurality 
opinion in Fox contests this claim, arguing that independent agencies are 
just as politically accountable as executive agencies albeit to Congress 
rather than the President.250 
The logic of Justice Scalia’s Fox plurality fails to compel.  First, the 
available empirical evidence indicates that an agency’s independence 
from presidential control does not correspond to enhanced congressional 
oversight.251  Second, Congress, unlike the executive branch with a 
single President atop the institutional hierarchy,252 is a disparate body 
                                                            
 247.   Supra Section III.A.  
 248.   Compare supra Section II.A with Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vendenbergh, 
Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 47, 83 (2006) (arguing that White House involvement in administration “may not promote 
much political accountability in a functional sense – that is, with the aim of ensuring that regulatory 
activity reflects public preferences and resists narrow influences.”). 
 249.   Gossett, supra note 223, at 689 n.40 (noting the political accountability or “Separation of 
Powers” rationale “would imply that independent agencies might not deserve Chevron 
deference . . . .”); David E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, Political Control and the Forms of Agency 
Independence, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1487, 1515 (2015). 
 250.   FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 524 (2009).  
 251.   Brian D. Feinstein, Designing Agencies for Congressional Control, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 
259, 259, 276 (2017) (arguing that independent agencies, which Feinstein defined as agencies 
containing “fixed terms for appointees and statutory mandates on appointee qualifications”, “appear 
to be more independent of congressional as well as presidential control, contrary to a conventional 
wisdom that they tend to reflect Congress’s preferences.”).  
 252.   Kagan, supra note 10, at 2255; CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 86, at 3; Lawrence Lessig 
& Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1994). But 
see Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1761 
(2013) (arguing that presidential direction of administration emerges from more diffuse sources than 
proponents of the unitary executive believe due to the President’s delegation of regulatory review).  
Even if Professor Nou’s account of agency self-insulation casts some doubt on the unitary nature of 
presidential oversight of regulation, power in the Executive branch remains significantly more 
centralized than in Congress, which Nou acknowledges “has effectively abdicated the monitoring of 
its initial delegations of power.”  Id. at 1764 (citing Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 
166 (1984)). 
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with oversight powers allocated to different committees across both the 
House and Senate,253 rendering congressional control a less direct and 
thus less effective instrument of political accountability than presidential 
control.  Third, to the extent that congressional control of independent 
agencies is both possible and desirable,254 the available mechanisms by 
which Congress may control independent agencies quite simply do not 
facilitate political involvement in administrative processes as effectively 
as presidential control in the form of, for example, OIRA review.  
Congress may set the terms under which administrative rulemaking and 
adjudication occur but lacks the capacity to exert control over either 
process once underway.255 
Ex ante congressional controls,256 implemented legislatively in the 
form of mandatory delegations and “hard-wiring” of agencies procedural 
requirements or structural modifications,257 dictate the terms on which 
agency decision-making occurs, but cannot stop the process once set in 
motion.  Further, ex ante controls are best enforced through heightened 
judicial scrutiny of independent agency decision-making.  Less 
deferential judicial review of independent agencies’ interpretive 
decisions constitutes perhaps the most significant mechanism by which 
courts may encourage ex ante congressional control of administration to 
the extent that such review facilitates a closer adherence to the relevant 
delegating statutes and legislatively mandated procedures.258  Ex poste 
congressional controls such as appropriations riders,259 seek to control 
agency action in enforcement proceedings after the rulemaking process 
has been completed but, again, cannot dictate the outcome of an 
                                                            
 253.   Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 183, 187 (2013) 
(arguing that Congress’ ability to supervise administration is severely impeded by “collective action 
problems, information deficits, and only episodic interest in bureaucratic affairs.  Complete 
delegation, as currently conceived and applied by the courts, makes legislators’ task of managing 
agency slack that much more difficult.”); Kagan, supra note 10, at 2259–60. 
 254.   Macey, supra note 127; Beermann, Congressional Administration, supra note 127, 72, 
n.38. 
 255.   Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), legitimated communications between 
legislators and EPA in the rulemaking process, but only so long as those communications expressed 
the interests of an individual legislator’s constituents, rather than Congress as a whole.  The Costle 
court stated “[w]e believe it entirely proper for Congressional representatives vigorously to represent 
the interests of their constituents before administrative agencies engaged in informal, general policy 
rulemaking, so long as individual Congressmen do not frustrate the intent of Congress as a whole as 
expressed in statute, nor undermine applicable rules of procedure.”  Id. at 409 (emphasis added). 
 256.   Beermann, Congressional Administration, supra note 127, at 72.  
 257.   Id.  
 258.   Id. at 71 (“Congress’s most important formal method of influencing the administration of 
law is legislation . . .”).  
 259.   Id. at 72, n.38. 
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administrative process.  In short, because there exists no evidence that 
Congress passes more legislation controlling independent agencies than 
executive agencies,260 congressional control of independent agencies 
does not provide political accountability in administration remotely 
comparable to that provided by the exertion of presidential control over 
executive agencies. 
By granting deference only to statutory interpretations promulgated 
by executive agencies, this reformulated Chevron Step Zero would better 
facilitate politically accountable administration in those agencies which 
Congress sought to render politically accountable.  Simultaneously, this 
rule governing the grant of deference would subject the interpretations of 
those agencies that Congress sought to insulate from presidential control 
to more rigorous review to ensure those independent agencies considered 
only the apolitical factors Congress statutorily prescribed.  In both 
Chevron’s application and its denial, then, courts would encourage 
political accountability in administration through the appropriate, 
congressionally-selected mechanism: either executive or statutory 
control.  While statutory control remains relevant, of course, for 
executive agencies under Chevron Step Two,261 courts’ responsibility to 
hold independent agencies, lacking an alternative source of political 
accountability, to their statutory mandates would take on a greater 
significance262 in this reformulated Step Zero.  The statute as the primary 
source of political control is, axiomatically, even more true in the context 
of Chevron and statutory interpretation conducted by independent 
agencies than in the broader context of arbitrary and capricious review, 
where Justice Scalia claimed independent agencies remain subject to 
other forms of political control.263 
Third, and less prominent but still present in the Chevron court’s 
justification for its deference to agency legal determinations, are 
concerns for the promotion of the exercise of agency expertise.  While 
this justification for Chevron deference has been largely absent from the 
court’s recent Chevron Step Zero analysis,264 a reformulated Step Zero 
                                                            
 260.   Feinstein, supra note 251. 
 261.   Supra Section III.A.  
 262.   David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran advance a related claim in DELEGATING POWER: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 57–58 (1999) 
(demonstrating that congressional delegations contain more specific mandates during periods of 
divided government to minimize the discretion afforded to the implementing authority). 
 263.   In Fox, Justice Scalia identified congressional committee oversight as ensuring Congress 
maintained control over the FCC’s decision.  FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523–26 
(2009).  
 264.   See, e.g., both Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in City 
 
624 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
analysis that conditions deferential review upon an agency’s 
independence would facilitate the exercise of agency expertise for those 
questions that Congress sought to be determined by apolitical 
technocracy, while leaving room for agencies to consider political factors 
when implementing those statutory authorizations that Congress 
delegated to agencies under executive control.265  The threat of a more 
searching judicial review for those agencies that Congress intended to be 
most technocratic would discourage presidential direction of an 
independent agency’s interpretive actions.266 
Finally, and prominent in Justice Scalia’s objections to Chevron Step 
Zero,267 are questions of judicial administrability.  The Supreme Court’s 
application of Chevron Step Zero provides little guidance for lower 
courts in determining whether a particular agency action warrants 
deference,268 and lower courts have tended to avoid the question rather 
than reconcile the Supreme Court’s perplexing jurisprudence.269  
Conditioning Chevron deference upon the independence of the agency 
receiving the delegation, however, would pose few problems for lower 
courts to administer.270  Indeed, the straightforward analysis under the 
reformulated Step Zero proposed here would ask only: (1) is the statute 
being interpreted one that the agency is tasked with implementing, and 
(2) is the interpretation promulgated by an executive agency in the 
implementation of that statute?  While approximating congressional 
                                                            
of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013).  Justice Breyer appears far more cognizant of agency 
expertise as a relevant consideration, but only as one of many potentially relevant factors.  See, e.g., 
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (listing “the related expertise of the Agency” as one of 
many factors in determining whether the Court should deferentially review the agency’s statutory 
interpretation); City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 311 (Breyer, J., concurring) (granting Chevron 
deference because, inter alia, “the provision concerns an interstitial administrative matter, in respect 
to which the agency’s expertise could have an important role to play; and . . . the matter, in context, 
is complex, likely making the agency’s expertise useful in helping to answer the ‘reasonableness’ 
question that the statute poses.”). 
 265.   Barkow, supra note 66, at 19; May, Defining Deference Down, supra note 67, at 445.  
 266.   While it is also likely that independent agencies, assumed by both scholars and courts to 
possess greater “expertise” than executive agencies, Barkow, supra note 66, at 19, could employ that 
expertise to derive additional logically-relevant extra-statutory considerations when interpreting a 
statutory authorization, such considerations would survive heightened judicial scrutiny to the extent 
that they are indeed logically-relevant to the implementation of the agency’s statutory authorization.  
This is particularly true when that heightened judicial scrutiny would be aimed at improper 
presidential involvement. 
 267.   United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 240–41 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 268.   Sunstein, supra note 65. 
 269.   Bressman, How Mead has Muddled, supra note 71, at 1491. 
 270.   Even if there exists significant scholarly debate about the precise definition of an 
independent agency, courts should consider congressional designations dispositive when the aim is 
to approximate congressional intent.  
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intent and promoting politically accountable administration, neither of 
these questions raises the often irresolvable and highly-court 
dependent271 determinations required under Mead. 
3. Counterarguments 
The following subsection addresses the counterarguments, both 
doctrinal and normative, that may be marshalled against the reformulated 
Step Zero proposed here.  First, and the strongest criticism of the 
reformulated Step Zero that animates Justice Breyer’s multi-factor test, 
are claims that only a case-by-case multi-factor approach can best 
capture the subtle variations in congressional intent.272  Applied to the 
reformulated Step Zero, this claim asks whether some agencies, even in 
implementing a single authorizing statute, may promulgate both 
interpretations to which Congress prefers courts defer and interpretations 
to which Congress prefers courts closely scrutinize. 
Even if the multi-factor test that the Supreme Court currently 
employs better approximates the range of delegations that Congress may 
utilize,273 lower courts’ difficulty administering the multi-factor test 
undermines the precision of those approximations.274  Especially given 
the Supreme Court’s limited oversight ability due to its restricted 
caseload,275 clearer rules for lower courts to apply are particularly 
important.  When Mead is accurately understood to be an attempt by the 
Supreme Court to “try[] to affect congressional behavior”276 as a 
reflection of congressional intent, Mead’s proponents will struggle to 
argue that the doctrine’s precision in approximating congressional intent 
justifies difficulties in implementation.277 
At the circuit court level, these barriers to implementation undermine 
the subtlety of the markers of congressional intent the Supreme Court 
employs in Barnhart.  One comprehensive study of Chevron at the 
circuit level found the “largescale absence [of Barnhart and other 
                                                            
 271.   Bressman, How Mead has Muddled, supra note 71, at 1491. 
 272.   Supra notes 197–99 (Breyer’s concurrence in Mead). 
 273.   Id.  
 274.   Bressman, How Mead has Muddled, supra note 71, at 1491.  
 275.   See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based 
Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 152 (2010) (noting the “extraordinary” decline in the 
Supreme Court’s plenary docket). 
 276.   Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory 
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 624 (2014).  
 277.   See Barron & Kagan, supra note 54, at 223.   
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contextual factors] from deference discussions in the circuit courts.”278  
The fact that circuit courts decline to employ the multi-factor analysis 
under Barnhart, preferring the “the relatively more rule-like certainty of 
Mead”,279 demonstrates the following.  First, that existing Step Zero 
doctrine may only claim to constitute a superior approximation of 
congressional intent in the miniscule minority of Chevron cases decided 
at the Supreme Court.  Second, the Supreme Court’s pursuit of ever more 
precise approximations of congressional intent amounts to little more 
than an intellectual exercise.  Further, and perhaps partially animating the 
circuit courts’ reluctance to apply Barnhart’s multi-factor analysis, the 
binary nature of Chevron deference280 renders Chevron a particularly 
poor delivery vehicle for a carefully-calibrated deference scheme.  In 
other words, a doctrine highly responsive to distinctions in degrees of 
delegated authority that then only applies, or declines to apply, a blanket 
level of deference undermines the doctrine’s own claim to precision.  A 
blanket presumption, which much of the court still understands Chevron 
to be, functions better when applied by bright-line.281 
Second, and perhaps an indication of the doctrine’s incoherence, 
some scholars have attempted to reclaim Chevron Step Zero from 
Chevron, finding justifications for the doctrine’s development in areas of 
law and policy beyond the question of judicial deference to agency’s 
statutory interpretations.  Proponents of a clear(er) distinction between 
legislative and non-legislative rules have argued that Mead and Barnhart 
mark a significant step towards a judicially-recognized definition of 
                                                            
 278.   Barnett & Walker, supra note 219, at 70.  
 279.   Id. (noting circuit courts curious refusal of the discretion provided by the “ad-hoc 
approaches before Chevron or offered by Barnhart” that would “better hide strategic 
decisionmaking”, in favor of the Mead rule: “circuit courts seem to have found some benefits in 
having others limit their agency”). 
 280.   Perhaps now tri-partite, with the possibility of no deference, Skidmore deference, or 
Chevron deference.  See supra Section III.A.  
 281.   Mead alone remains an inferior bright-line than the agency independence indicia proposed 
here.  Mead’s force of law test is both over- and under-inclusive.  Mead is over-inclusive because 
Congress might wish for an agency to issue binding rules but still be subjected to de novo review of 
any interpretations of ambiguous terms made in the course issuing those binding rules.  Indeed, the 
APA’s “provision on judicial review permits this division,” signaling that “Congress must have 
contemplated . . . some division of substantive lawmaking authority from interpretive authority.”  
Kagan & Barron, supra note 54, at 218.  Simultaneously, however, Mead is under-inclusive because 
Congress might seek to grant interpretive authority to an agency even if that agency lacks the power 
to issue binding rules.  Id. at 219.  Even if an agency’s independence is a similarly imperfect 
approximation insofar as it is possible to conceive of a congressional delegation that intended to 
grant interpretive authority to an independent agency, an agency’s independence directly signals the 
degree to which Congress sought to insulate that agency from the president as source of extra-
statutory factors for consideration and Chevron most fundamentally concerns an agency’s derivation 
of the factors upon which that agency may rely in support of an administrative outcome.  
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nonlegislative rules as nonbinding in practice.  This argument suggests 
Mead and Barnhart resolved the complex judicial debates about the 
distinction between legislative and non-legislative rules, rendering 
nonlegislative rules “nonbinding in practice” and thereby enshrining in 
doctrine the view that only rules issued under notice and comment are 
legally binding.282  The general difficulty scholars have had in justifying 
Mead and Step Zero on its own terms has encouraged the serious 
treatment of this claim,283 but proponents of this justification for Mead 
have yet to resolve the ‘severability’ problem.  Even if Mead implies 
certain desirable doctrinal outcomes outside the context of Chevron, 
there is little reason those desirable outcomes cannot remain doctrine 
while the Court consigns Mead itself to the dustbin.  To the extent that 
Mead serves other purposes that would be undermined by a reformulated 
Chevron Step Zero, the previous objections to Mead make clear that the 
Chevron doctrine is an inappropriate site for such a doctrinal 
development.284  Further, there remains significant disagreement about 
whether courts should universally treat any rule that has not gone 
through notice and comment as nonlegislative and thus not legally 
binding.285 
Third are concerns for precedent.  While the reformulated Step Zero 
no doubt would amount to a significant departure from precedent, there 
exist two relevant doctrinal hooks.  As an initial matter, Justice Breyer’s 
multifactor test implementing Chevron Step Zero, which is most likely 
                                                            
 282.   John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 940 (2004); Jacob E. 
Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1720–21 (2007). 
 283.   David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 
120 YALE L.J. 276 (2010).  Franklin advances three arguments.  First, Mead creates only a 
presumption that non-legislative rules are ineligible for Chevron deference, meaning Mead fails to 
implement any bright-line on the non-binding effect of non-legislative rules as demonstrated in 
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).  Id. at 320.  Second, because nonlegislative rules would 
still receive Skidmore deference, the claim that they become “nonbinding in practice”, Manning, 
supra note 282, at 940, is inaccurate because Skidmore deference may still be quite deferential.  Id. 
at 321.  Third, Mead does little to prevent agencies receiving deference under Bowles v. Seminole 
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), for non-legislative rules interpreting their own regulations.  
Id. at 323–24. 
  284.   This claim—“right outcome, wrong mechanism”—responds to a related reclamation of 
Mead, made by Professor Gluck, supra note 276, at 623–25, arguing that Mead provided an “end run 
around” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), 
which held that federal courts could not add procedural requirements beyond those specified in the 
APA to agency statutory implementation.  Professor Gluck argues Mead “accomplishes close to the 
same result [of allowing federal courts to add procedural requirements beyond those set forth in the 
APA] in a more indirect fashion, encouraging agencies to use formal procedures if they want their 
interpretations to get deference.”  Gluck, supra note 276, at 624.  
 285.   Compare, Franklin, supra note 283, at 324–25 with Manning, supra note 282 and Gersen, 
supra note 282. 
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controlling,286 includes an assessment of the delegatee-agency’s 
characteristics, including independence.287  Accordingly, the 
reformulation requires only heightening the emphasis placed on this 
factor, a process for synthesizing and simplifying multifactor tests with 
which the Court possesses extensive familiarity.288  Should the Court 
maintain the Mead/Barnhart multifactor Step Zero analysis, this Article 
more modestly argues courts should consider an agency’s independence 
as a significant or even dispositive factor in whether Chevron should 
apply, particularly for those decisions implicating an agency’s reliance 
upon extra-statutory political factors. 
Moreover, the fact that Justice Breyer’s Fox dissent, applying 
heightened scrutiny to independent agency action,289 commanded as 
many votes as Justice Scalia’s plurality expressly rejecting stricter 
review for independent agencies290 evinces the existence of near-
sufficient support for conditioning deference upon agency 
independence.291  While Chevron went unreferenced in Fox,292 Justice 
Scalia and Justice Breyer’s opinions diverged on Chevron’s initial 
justification: the extent to which an agency’s political accountability 
should implicate the rigor of judicial review of that agency.293  The 
concerns animating Chevron have no doubt evolved over the past three 
decades,294 consolidating around the likely fictitious claim to 
                                                            
 286.   Supra notes 211–19 (discussing Barnhart). 
 287.   City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 309 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that 
the agency’s expertise in administering a complex matter weighs in favor of deference). 
 288.   See, e.g., the evolution in the Court’s doctrine governing the recognition of implied private 
rights of action.  The Court narrowed its analysis from the four factors presented by Justice Brennan 
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) to the single question of congressional intent.  See, e.g., 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 289.   FCC v. Fox, 556 U.S. 502, 547 (2009). 
 290.   Id. at 523. 
 291.   Indeed, in some regards the conditional deference for which Justice Breyer’s Fox dissent 
advocates a more radical doctrinal departure than that advocated here; Breyer’s Fox dissent 
addresses independent agency action generally, and not just in the relatively narrow domain of 
agency’s interpretations of statutes.  Fox, 556 U.S. at 547.  While it is to this reading of Justice 
Breyer’s Fox dissent that Justice Scalia’s plurality responds, id. at 523, Breyer’s dissent need not be 
read as a call for heightened scrutiny, depending on one’s gloss of “all the more important.”  Id. at 
547 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 292.   Id.  
 293.   May, Defining Deference Down, Again, supra note 69, at 448. But see, Enrique Armijo, 
Politics, Rulemaking, and Judicial Review: A Response to Professor Watts, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 573, 
581 (2010).  Of course, Chevron governs one area of substantive arbitrary and capricious review, 
supra Section III.A, implying that if extra-statutory considerations provide sufficient support, 
according to at least four Justices, for a particular agency action under a less deferential form of 
review than Chevron, extra-statutory considerations may control Chevron-eligible interpretations, as 
well. 
 294.   This development renders May’s claims less powerful than if they had been advanced in 
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approximate congressional intent,295 but the Fox opinions remain 
relevant so long as the Chevron prudential considerations hold any 
sway.296 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As opposed to the law governing the sufficiency of an agency’s 
procedures for arriving at an administrative outcome, substantive 
administrative law—governing the sufficiency of an agency’s 
justifications for that outcome—is most fundamentally a matching 
exercise.  The reviewing court decides if the set of justifications the 
agency provided reflect the factors that Congress intended the agency to 
consider when implementing the relevant statutory authorization.  In this 
way, judicial review of agency reason giving most frequently takes the 
form not of an assessment of the technical merits of the decision, but 
instead a demarcation of the factors an agency may consider followed by 
a determination of whether the reasons supplied reside within that set of 
permissible factors.  The doctrinal development in Chevron was to 
formalize and, at least initially, universalize the presumption that an 
agency’s statutorily derived reasons for acting aligned with the reasons 
upon which Congress intended the agency to act.  Instead of interpreting 
the aims of a relevant statute and deriving congressional intent regarding 
permissible factors for consideration, post-Chevron courts presumptively 
accept agencies’ statutory derivations of the permissible reasons an 
agency may provide in support of an administrative outcome. 
Over the three and a half decades that followed, the Court pursued 
increasingly elusive notions of congressional intent, developing a set of 
conditions detailing the type of agency action in review of which courts 
would apply this presumptive deference.  To the extent that this 
presumptive deference provides meaningful freedom for agencies to 
derive permissible factors for consideration, the set of conditions upon 
which access to that deference hinges become the parameters of 
                                                            
the years immediately following Chevron when prudential concerns for political accountability 
rather than interpretive fictions of congressional intent animated the Court’s deference doctrine.  
 295.   Supra Section III.A.  But see Bressman, supra note 232; Gluck & Bressman, supra note 
188.  The implications of Professors Gluck and Bressman’s study for Chevron are complex; while 
Gluck and Bressman reported a significant majority of the surveyed congressional staffers were 
familiar with Chevron (82%), id. at 995–96, for the majority of the surveyed staffers, “Chevron does 
not appear to have increased the likelihood of ambiguity or its use as an additional signal that 
drafters were not using before the Court’s decision . . . . Chevron itself does not seem to be a typical 
reason for ambiguity.” Gluck & Bressman, supra note 188, at 997.  
 296.   Watts, supra note 98, at 731.  
630 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
administrative reason giving.  So long as an agency acted under those 
conditions, reviewing courts would defer to the agency’s derivation of 
the reasons supplied and often, therefore, to the administrative outcome. 
Prescriptively, this Article sought to demonstrate that the set of 
conditions under which courts grant deference to, in effect, agency 
reason giving are divorced from concerns for both politically accountable 
and expert administration.  Rather than attempt to approximate what 
even the doctrine’s creators have acknowledged to be a fictitious notion 
of congressional intent with increasing nuance, the Court should adopt a 
bright line rule granting deference to executive agencies’ derivation of 
permissible factors for consideration but denying such deference to 
independent agencies’ statutory interpretations.  The benefits of such a 
rule are twofold.  First, this rule acknowledges the preeminent role of the 
President in controlling the administrative state through the President’s 
ability to dictate the extra-statutory factors an agency must consider 
when acting and thereby promote politically accountable administration.  
Second, this rule ensures that those decisions Congress delegated to 
independent agencies are made according to the agency’s technical 
expertise exercised free from political pressure.  More modestly 
formulated, this Article suggests that courts consider directly the 
implications for administrative reason giving of the various deference 
doctrines; such consideration may encourage a rethinking of the 
conditions under which agencies’ legal interpretations receive deference. 
 
